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Abstract
We build an equilibrium model of a small open economy with labor market frictions and
imperfectly enforced regulations. Heterogeneous firms sort into the formal or informal sector.
We estimate the model using data from Brazil, and use counterfactual simulations to understand
how trade affects economic outcomes in the presence of informality. We show that: (1) Trade
openness unambiguously decreases informality in the tradable sector, but has ambiguous effects
on aggregate informality. (2) The productivity gains from trade are understated when the infor-
mal sector is omitted. (3) Trade openness results in large welfare gains even when informality is
repressed. (4) Repressing informality increases productivity, but at the expense of employment
and welfare. (5) The effects of trade on wage inequality are reversed when the informal sector
is incorporated in the analysis. (6) The informal sector works as an “unemployment,” but not
a “welfare buffer” in the event of negative economic shocks.
JEL codes: F14, F16, J46, O17
∗Dix-Carneiro: rafael.dix.carneiro@duke.edu; Goldberg: penny.goldberg@yale.edu; Meghir: c.meghir@yale.edu;
Ulyssea: g.ulyssea@ucl.ac.uk. This project was supported by award SES-1629124 from the National Science Founda-
tion and by the Early Career Research Grant 15-150-04 from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
We would like to thank Nina Pavcnik, Jean-Marc Robin, and Jim Tybout, as well as numerous seminar and conference
participants, for helpful comments and discussions.
1 Introduction
A substantial share of the labor force in many emerging and developing economies is employed
informally; for example, in Latin America, informality ranges from 35 percent in Chile to 80 percent
in Peru (Perry et al., 2007). Yet, the informal sector is near absent in theoretical and empirical
work in trade. The few papers that have focused on the role of the informal sector during trade
liberalization episodes suggest that shifts into and out of informal employment constitute important
margins of labor market adjustment in response to trade shocks. These papers have relied on
sectoral or regional variation to identify relative effects. For example, in the context of Vietnam,
McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) exploit sectoral variation to show that the United States-Vietnam
Bilateral Trade Agreement induced reallocation of labor from informal to formal manufacturing in
the most affected sectors. On the other hand, studies that have focused on Latin America (e.g.,
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019), Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020)) have
found that trade liberalization often increases informal employment in the most impacted sectors or
regions. Moreover, the results in Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019) and Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020)
suggest that the informal sector may serve as a buffer to trade-displaced workers, and that in the
absence of informality, the effects of foreign competition on unemployment might have been more
severe. While the above studies point to a potentially important role of the informal sector during
an economy’s adjustment to trade or other economic shocks, they cannot—by design—speak to the
aggregate implications of informality, and they do not permit welfare analysis. This paper aims to
fill this gap by developing a general equilibrium framework that allows for such analysis.
On the worker side, one can broadly define informality in two ways: The first defines a worker
as informal if she does not have permanent and stable employment associated with benefits such
as health and social security. The second defines a worker as informal if, in addition to not
receiving benefits, she is invisible to the tax authorities and her employer illegally evades labor
market regulations (including minimum wages and firing rules). The first definition has become
relevant even in developed countries in recent years with the emergence of the gig economy. The
second definition applies primarily to developing countries where the tax evasion associated with
informality is a first-order issue. On the firm side, informality implies that firms do not comply
with taxes or relevant regulations (e.g., labor laws). This can be harmful for two main reasons.
First, it may lead to substantial misallocation of resources and hamper growth, as unproductive
firms that survive by evading taxes and avoiding compliance with labor market regulations prevent
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the allocation of labor to more productive firms. Second, it implies tax evasion, hindering fiscal
capacity and the provision of public goods. On the other hand, as suggested by Dix-Carneiro and
Kovak (2019) and Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020), informality may provide de facto flexibility for firms
and workers to cope with adverse shocks.
Building on Coşar et al. (2016), we develop a structural equilibrium model with heterogeneous
firms that choose whether to operate in the formal or in the informal sector. The model features a
rich institutional setting, where formal firms must comply with minimum wages, and are subject
to firing costs as well as payroll and revenue taxes. However, taxes and labor market regulations
are imperfectly enforced by the government, giving rise to incentives for some firms to be informal.
Finally, the economy consists of tradable and non-tradable sectors that interact. Only formal firms
that produce tradable goods are able to export.
We estimate the model using multiple data sources, including matched employer-employee data
from formal and informal firms and workers in Brazil, as well as several other sources of firm- and
worker-level data such as household surveys, manufacturing and services censuses, and customs
data. Then, we conduct a series of counterfactual experiments to better understand the impact of
trade shocks on an economy with a large informal sector. While the focus of the present paper is on
trade, we note that the framework we develop can be applied to study the effects of several other
policies, such as changes in payroll taxes, value added taxes, minimum wages, and unemployment
benefits, either individually or jointly.
Brazil, with its excellent sources of data for the formal and the informal sectors, provides an
excellent setting for our work. Nearly two thirds of businesses and 40 percent of GDP are informal
(Ulyssea, 2018) and the labor regulations are both substantive and weakly enforced. Moreover,
there is a clear definition of what constitutes informality: we define as informal workers those who
do not hold a formal labor contract, clearly observable through the worker’s booklet carteira de
trabalho. Informal firms are those not registered with the tax authorities, which means that they
do not possess the tax identification number required for Brazilian firms (Cadastro Nacional de
Pessoa Juŕıdica—CNPJ) and which we are able to also observe.
Our estimated model rationalizes a number of findings reported in the empirical literature,
while yielding new insights. We find that trade openness, induced by a reduction in iceberg trade
costs, leads to large declines in informality in the tradable sector, an effect that is robust to the
initial level of trade costs, the magnitude of their decline, and the regulatory environment. On the
other hand, we find that the effects of trade openness on informality in the non-tradable sector
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are more nuanced and context-dependent. As a result, the overall effect of trade on informality
is ambiguous, and generally small. This result is consistent with the casual observation that the
informal sector has not substantially shrunk in middle-income economies despite the large-scale
liberalization episodes these experienced in the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, World Bank,
2019).
Further, we find that trade openness is associated with substantive increases in productivity
and welfare. Importantly, we show that the productivity gains from trade are severely understated
in the tradable sector, if one leaves out the informal sector (as analyses of trade liberalization
episodes typically do). For the non-tradable sector, our results point to a bias in the opposite
direction, but in the aggregate, the tradable sector effect dominates. As a result, we conclude that
the productivity gains from trade for the economy as a whole are understated in analyses focusing
exclusively on the formal sector of the economy.
One of the main rationales for reducing informality is the wish to increase productivity. Our
counterfactual analysis shows that indeed, reducing or eliminating informality through stricter
monitoring and enforcement raises productivity. However, the productivity gains are achieved at the
expense of employment and welfare. In contrast, trade liberalization achieves sizable productivity
gains while raising aggregate welfare, and seems therefore a superior way to increase productivity.
Our analysis also has implications for wage inequality. We find that the inclusion of the informal
sector reverses predictions on the effects of trade on inequality that is driven by firm heterogeneity.
If we focus on the formal sector alone (again, as most earlier analyses have done), we observe that
trade liberalization contributes to a rise in wage inequality. However, the effect in the informal
sector goes in the opposite direction, while the distance between average formal and informal wages
decreases. As a result, trade liberalization reduces aggregate wage inequality driven by differences
across firms.
Finally, our results lend strong support to the view that the informal sector serves as an “un-
employment buffer” during bad times: in the case of negative aggregate shocks, unemployment
increases by considerably more if informality is repressed. However, this “unemployment buffer”
role of informality does not translate into a “welfare buffer.” We find that, in the event of a negative
economic shock, welfare declines by less with lower informality. This somewhat counterintuitive
result is due to a positive selection effect arising from the exit of inefficient, informal firms in that
case—in other words, from a strong “creative destruction” effect.
The aforementioned results arise from the interaction of several mechanisms in operation, which
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we discuss in the model section as well as in the presentation of the counterfactual experiments. In
general, our Melitz-type framework implies several selection effects, as multiple entry and formal-
ization thresholds in the tradable and non-tradable sectors shift in response to trade and domestic
policies. These interact in our model with labor market frictions as well as with domestic reg-
ulations, especially minimum wages and enforcement of regulations, to produce the patterns we
summarized above. Overall, our findings demonstrate the importance of incorporating the infor-
mal sector in analyses of trade policies.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our model. Section 3 discusses the main
regulations in place in the Brazilian economy, and section 4 describes the data we use to estimate
the model. Section 5 details the estimation procedure, discusses identification and shows how the
model fits key aspects of the data. Section 6 shows our counterfactual experiments and section 7
presents our main takeaways.
2 Model
We start by considering a closed-economy setup in sections 2.1 through 2.4 and extend the model
to the open economy in section 2.5. Section 2.6 discusses the mechanisms through which trade
affects informality and section 2.7 lists the equilibrium conditions.
2.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by homogeneous, infinitely-lived workers-consumers. Individuals derive
utility from two composite goods, C and S, each combining tradable and non-tradable sector



























and ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of expenditure on tradable-sector goods, σk > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution across varieties within sector k ∈ {C, S}, Nkt denotes the measure of varieties available
in sector k at time t, n ∈ (0, Nkt) indexes varieties, and 11+r is the discount factor. As we will focus
on steady-state equilibria, we henceforth drop the time subscript t for notational convenience.
1The terminology “tradable” and “non-tradable” is used to classify goods across sectors of the economy. Tradable
refers primarily to manufacturing sectors, whereas non-tradable refers primarily to service sectors.
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2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms with heterogeneous productivities in both the tradable and non-
tradable sectors. Formal and informal firms coexist in both sectors, and each firm produces a
unique variety n ∈ (0, Nk), k ∈ {C, S}. Firms in each sector k produce using labor and intermediate
inputs in a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
qk (z, `, ιk) = z`
δkι1−δkk , (3)
where z denotes the firm’s total factor productivity, ` denotes the firm’s employment size, ιk denotes
sector k’s intermediate input usage, and δk ∈ (0, 1). Intermediate inputs ιk in sector k are given by






where imC and imS are CES aggregates defined in exactly the same way and with the same
parameters to those in equation (2,) and λk ∈ (0, 1) is the share of sector k’s intermediate input
payments to sector C goods. Firms’ idiosyncratic productivity z evolves over time following the
AR(1) process below:
ln z′ = ρk ln z + σ
z
kε, ρk ∈ (0, 1), ε ∼ N(0, 1), (5)
where σzk is the standard deviation of the shocks.
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Monopolistic competition implies that gross revenues as a function of output q in sector k ∈















1−σk is the price index
for sector k ∈ {C, S}, and pk (n) is the price charged by firm n in sector k. Aggregate expenditure
on tradable-sector goods is given by XC = ζI+X
int
C , where I is aggregate income and X
int
C is total
expenditure, by firms, on intermediate goods from sector C. Similarly, for the non-tradable sector,
aggregate expenditure is given by XS = (1− ζ) I +XintS +ES , where XintS is total expenditure, by
firms, on intermediate goods from sector S and ES represents expenditures on non-tradable-sector
goods made by firms in order to cover entry, hiring, fixed and export costs (which we discuss below).
Aggregate income is determined by total wages, government transfers and aggregate firms’ profits.
2This process is imposed to be the same across formal and informal firms within tradable and non-tradable
sectors. Unfortunately, we do not have longitudinal data on firms in the informal sector, so that this process cannot
be separately identified for formal and informal firms.
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Figure 1: Diagram of Firms’ Behavior
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Firms can freely adjust their intermediate input usage. Denote by ιk (z, `) the optimal interme-
diate input usage of a firm in sector k with productivity z and ` workers. This firm’s gross revenue





. It is easy to show that expenditures on
intermediates are proportional to gross revenues, resulting in the following expression for firm-level
value added:
V Ak (z, `) =
σk − (1− δk) (σk − 1)
σk
Rk (z, `) . (7)
Timing
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Formal firms are indexed by f and informal firms are
indexed by i. Consider an informal firm that starts period t with productivity z and employment
level `. In the first stage, this firm may: (i) stay informal; (ii) exit, either as a result of an
endogenous decision or because of an exogenous shock that occurs with probability αk; (iii) become
formal. In the second stage, the firm decides whether to adjust its workforce (up or down) to `′ or
not at all. Right after this decision the firm realizes profits and pays wages to its workers. In stage
3, the firm draws a new productivity value z′ and starts period t+ 1 with state (z′, `′). The timing
and sequence of events for formal firms is the same as that for informal ones, except that we do
not allow them to become informal.
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Hiring and Firing Costs
Both formal and informal firms in tradable and non-tradable sectors face hiring costs. We param-
eterize hiring costs as a function of employment levels ` and number of posted vacancies υ:








where hk, γk1 > 1 and γk2 ∈ (0, 1) are parameters to be estimated. If µυkj is the probability of
filling a vacancy faced by a firm of type j ∈ {f, i} in sector k ∈ {C, S}, then expanding from ` to `′
requires posting υ = `
′−`
µυkj
vacancies.3 The cost of expanding from ` to `′ workers for a firm of type















The value of γk2 controls the extent to which firm-level growth rates in employment decline
with size, a stylized fact in the data that we discuss in section 4. The parameter γk1 governs the
convexity of the hiring function. Allowing for convexity is important for the model to be able
to generate wage dispersion across firms. To build intuition for this fact, momentarily abstract
from dynamic considerations. In this case, the wage determination process we discuss in section
2.4 implies that wages are proportional to value-added per worker, which is—by virtue of our
assumptions—proportional to marginal value-added. Firms set marginal value added equal to the
marginal cost of an additional worker. With linear hiring costs, the marginal cost is constant and
equal across firms, so that wages will also be equalized across firms. In contrast, with convex hiring
costs, the marginal cost of an additional worker is increasing in the growth of employment, so that
expanding firms tend to pay higher wages.











where κ > 0 is the parameter governing the firing cost function. Consistent with the Brazilian
labor market regulations, we assume that firing costs are equal across the C and S sectors. In our
model, firing costs are collected by the government and are rebated back to consumers, while hiring
costs are incurred in terms of the non-tradable-sector composite good.
3Note that the probability of filling a vacancy µυkj is an endogenous object that will depend on the aggregate
number of vacancies in each sector k ∈ {C, S} and firm type j ∈ {f, i}, as well as on the mass of unemployed workers.
7
Profit and Value Functions
Formal firms are subject to payroll and value added taxes, firing costs and the minimum wage














where ck denotes a per-period, fixed cost of operation, which we define in units of the non-tradable
sector composite good; τy is a value-added tax, collected by the government and rebated to con-
sumers. Due to hiring and firing costs, the total cost function for a formal firm adjusting from ` to






 (1 + τw) max {wkf (z, `′) , w} `′ +Hkf (`, `′) if `′ > `(1 + τw) max {wkf (z, `′) , w} `′ + κ (`− `′) if `′ ≤ `, (12)
where the wage schedule wkf (z, `
′) is the result of a bargaining problem between the firm and its
workers that is detailed in section 2.4, w denotes the minimum wage and τw is the payroll tax,
which is also assumed to be collected by the government and rebated to consumers.
Since formal firms have to choose whether to stay or leave their industry, their value function
is given by:

















where αk denotes the exogenous destruction probability that firms face every period for k = C, S.
The solution of (13) leads to the employment policy function `′ = Lkf (z, `) and to the vacancy
posting policy function υkf (z, `) =
Lkf (z,`)−`
µvkf
×I [Lkf (z, `) > `] (as well as to other policies such as
exit and stay-active decisions).
While informal firms do not incur any of the regulatory costs (taxes, minimum wages, firing
costs), they do face an expected cost of informality, which includes the probability of detection
by the government and subsequent fines. It also includes a range of opportunity costs associated
with informality such as scarce access to formal financial markets (e.g. credit lines), hampering the
ability of firms to grow. As firms grow, they become more visible to the government and therefore
are inspected with higher probability, which entails costs in the form of fines and bribes, or can lead
to the firm shutting down its operations. Therefore, we allow the expected cost of informality as a
fraction of revenues, pki, to depend on the firm’s size `
′. Thus, the profit function of an informal



















where Kinf (z, `′) ≡ pki (`′)Rk (z, `′) are the expected costs associated with informality, which we



















 wki (z, `′) `′ +Hki (`, `′) if `′ > `wki (z, `′) `′ if `′ ≤ `, (16)
where wki (z, `
′) denotes the wage paid by an informal firm with productivity z and size `′. The
value functions of informal firms are similar to those of formal ones, except that they have the
additional option to formalize their businesses:
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The solution of (17) leads to the employment policy function `′ = Lki(z, `) and to the vacancy
posting policy function vki(z, `) =
Lki(z,`)−`
µvki
× I [Lki(z, `) > `] (as well as to other policies such as
exit, change to formal and stay informal decisions).
Entry
Firm entry is illustrated in Figure 2. Every period there is a mass Mk of entrants into the tradable
and non-tradable sectors. In the first stage within the period, entrants observe their productivity
z—drawn from the ergodic distribution gek implied by (5)—after incurring a sunk cost ce,k of entry
into sector k. Based on this productivity draw, the entering firm chooses to be formal or informal
or to exit immediately. Formal and informal entrants start their first period with workforce ` = 1,
whose recruitment cost is subsumed in ce,k. Following entry, in stage 2, the firm decides to adjust
its labor force to `′ just before the production stage. It then behaves as an incumbent, drawing
productivity z′ for the next period right after production (stage 3). The value functions for entrants
in either sector are given by:















where j = i, f . The value at entry together with the entry conditions is defined by
V ek = Ez max
{
V eki (z) , V
e




Figure 2: Diagram of Entry Behavior
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whose solution leads to the entry policy functions. Assuming there are positive masses of entrants
in each sector, free entry dictates that:
V ek = ce,k. (20)
2.3 Labor Market Frictions
Formal and informal labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions, which
prevent unemployed workers from immediately finding open vacancies and underlie part of hiring
costs, as equation (9) highlights. We assume random search, and therefore all unemployed workers
form a pool of individuals who randomly meet with formal or informal firms in one of the sectors
k = C, S. Thus, formal and informal firms operating in tradable and non-tradable sectors compete
for workers in the labor market. Given the total number of vacancies posted in each sector and
type of firm (υCf , υCi, υSf , υSi), and the mass of unemployed workers searching for jobs, Lu, the
total number of matches that are formed is given by:
m (υCf , υCi, υSf , υSi, Lu) = φυ̃
ξL1−ξu , (21)
Where υ̃ = υCf + υCi + υSf + υSi aggregates vacancies across sectors and types of firms, φ > 0,
and 0 < ξ < 1. Matches are split across sectors and firm types in proportion to the number of
vacancies posted, so that mkj =
υkj
υ̃ ×m matches are formed with firms of type j in sector k. Thus,
the probability of filling a vacancy (µυkj =
mkj
υkj
) is independent of sector and firm type. We denote
10







This expression highlights that formal firms directly compete with informal ones in the labor market.














Wage setting takes place after hiring and fixed costs have been sunk and matching has taken place.
We assume that a union engages in collective bargaining with the employer on behalf of the workers
over the surplus of the match, determining a wage wkj (z, `
′). The latter depends on the firm’s size
and productivity.
The surpluses of a formal firm in sector k (Sekf ), and the union it faces (S
u















































where b denotes the utility flow from being unemployed; bu denotes the value of unemployment
insurance benefits, which are only received by formal workers; Ju is the expected present value of
search; and Jekf (z, `
′) is the expected present value of a job in a formal-sector firm in sector k with
current productivity z and workforce `′—see Online Appendix I for its derivation.5
Let β be the parameter that drives workers’ bargaining power. If the joint surplus of the firm
















Importantly, the overall surplus depends on the wage because of payroll taxes: in other words, the
value of the surplus depends on how it is shared. This leads to a wage structure for formal workers
4µekj should be interpreted as the transition rate from unemployment to sector k and firm type j.
5We assume that if all workers leave, the firm exits, and that hiring costs and fixed operating costs are already



































Thus, the bargained wage is proportional to a convex combination between the firm’s value per
worker and the worker’s outside option net of the continuation value of the job to the worker,
Jekf (z, `
′).6 If wukf (z, `
′) leads to a negative union surplus then we set the wage equal to its
reservation value, that is, the wage wreskf (z, `
′) that solves Sukf (z, `
′) = 0. Therefore the outcome of
















As highlighted in equation (12), formal firms cannot pay below the minimum wage, so that wages
effectively paid are given by max {wkf (z, `′) , w}.
Wages in the informal sector are determined in a similar way. However, in the informal sector
unemployment insurance benefits are not offered, taxes are not paid and firms face an expected



















































and Jeki (z, `
′) is the analogous to Jekf (z, `
′) in the informal sector, see Online Appendix I for details.
Finally, the reservation wage, wreski (z, `
′), solves Suki (z, `
′) = 0, where Suki is the surplus of the union
in the informal sector. This places a lower bound on wages in the informal sector.
2.5 Open Economy
We now extend the model to the open economy case. We assume that the home country is small
relative to the rest of the world and therefore foreign conditions do not react to its policies. In
the following analysis, we drop the formal/informal qualifier in order to simplify notation, as we
assume throughout that informal firms cannot export.7
6The factor of proportionality 1 + βτw highlights that workers also bear the cost of payroll taxes.
7This assumption comes from the fact that firms that are not registered cannot undertake the necessary legal and
bureaucratic procedures to export.
12
Price Indices and Aggregate Variables
Let NF,C denote the measure of foreign varieties available to domestic consumers. Given the small
open economy assumption, this variable is assumed to be fixed. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the price index of free on board imports to be one, since foreign prices are exogenous to our
model. Thus, the price index of imports in domestic currency becomes PF,C = ετaτc, where ε is the
exchange rate, τa−1 > 0 is the ad-valorem tariff and τc > 1 the iceberg trade cost. The price index






and the price index for the composite tradable sector good is given by PC =
[





The domestic demand for goods produced domestically is given by QH,C (n) = DH,Cp (n)
−σC ,







; and the domestic demand for foreign-produced goods
is given by QH,C (n) = DH,C (ετaτcp
∗ (n))−σC , for n ∈ [0, NF,C ]—where p∗ (n) is the price of foreign
variety n in foreign currency. Finally, foreign demand for domestically produced goods is given





−σC , for n ∈ (NF,C , NC ], where p∗x (n) is the price of domestic variety n
in the foreign country, denominated in foreign currency, and D∗F is an exogenous foreign demand
shifter. If IxC (n) denotes an indicator function that equals one if variety n is exported, we have






and Exports = D∗F ε
∫ NC
NF,C
IxC (n) p∗x (n)
1−σC dn. (31)
Exporters
Given the expression of foreign demand for home variety n just described, QF,C(n), revenues from





σC , where qx is the total quantity exported. If a firm ex-
ports, it must decide which fraction η of its output to sell abroad. Conditional on being an
exporter, total gross revenue for producing a total of q units and exporting a fraction η of this
production is given by: R̃xC (q, η) = exp (dH,C + dF (η)) q
σC−1
























. It is easy to verify that all exporters opti-
mally decide to export the same fraction, ηo, of their production. In what follows, we will refer to
dF (η
o) simply as dF .
8 Empirically, dF is directly related to the fraction of gross revenues coming
















= 1− exp (−σC × dF ) , (32)
where RxC (z, `
′) ≡ R̃xC (qC (z, `′, ιC (z, `′)) , ηo) is the total gross revenue of an exporter with state
(z, `′) and Rdom,xC (z, `
′) is the portion of an exporter’s gross revenues coming from domestic sales.
















where ΛC ≡ σC−1σC−(1−δC)(σC−1) and V A
d
C is the value added function for non-exporters. It follows






 1 if V AxC (z, `′)− fx > V AdC (z, `′)0 otherwise, (34)
where fx > 0 denotes the fixed cost of exporting, which is denominated in terms of the non-tradable
composite good.
2.6 Trade and Informality: Discussion of Mechanisms
Our model includes several channels through which trade can impact informality, pushing the
response to changes in trade openness in different directions. The first mechanism linking trade
to informality is what we call “Melitz-type” mechanisms, which operate through various channels.
Import tariffs τa − 1 and iceberg trade costs τc directly affect expenditures XC and price indices
PC , which determine the aggregate demand faced by domestic firms in sector C. Changes in trade
barriers also affect the foreign demand shifter dF , which in turn affects aggregate demand faced by
exporters and the decision to export. Specifically, as trade barriers decline, exporters experience
increases in aggregate demand, whereas purely domestic firms face declines in aggregate demand,
as in Melitz (2003). These demand effects encourage exit of the least productive (purely domestic)
formal firms. They are replaced by informal firms, which tends to increase informality. On the
other hand, the same decline in aggregate demand faced by domestic firms pushes low-productivity
informal firms out of the market, which tends to reduce informality.
In addition, tariffs and trade costs affect the price of the intermediate composites ιk, effectively
altering optimal intermediate input usage by firms and, therefore, their workers’ productivity. This
effect on intermediate inputs amplifies the impact of tariff or trade cost reductions and is similar
in spirit to the “magnification” effect highlighted in the work of Fieler et al. (2018) and Coşar
et al. (2016) among others. A change in trade policy or other trade costs hence directly affect
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decisions of firms, including their decisions to enter, exit, and to produce as formal or informal.
Specifically, a reduction in trade barriers tends to make all firms more productive, through access
to cheaper intermediate goods. This encourages the most productive informal firms to grow and
formalize. However, it can also lead to entry of lower productivity informal firms, which have now
become profitable. Furthermore, trade openness induces a reallocation of resources toward larger
and more productive firms that export. This will tend to further increase aggregate productivity
and income, shifting aggregate demand up, generating incentives for productive informal firms to
grow and formalize. The net effect of all these forces will depend on the values of the parameters
we estimate.
The second mechanism linking openness to informality in our model is through its effect on
unemployment. We show in section 4 that, in the Brazilian data, transitions from unemployment
to informal employment are twice as large as transitions from unemployment to formal employment.
Therefore, the channels in our model linking openness to unemployment have implications for the
relative importance of the informal sector.
Accordingly, we now turn to the mechanisms linking trade to unemployment in our setup. All






> 1. This implies that exporters’ value added, and therefore
their hiring and firing decisions, are more sensitive to productivity shocks z. Therefore, as in
Coşar et al. (2016), reducing trade costs produces two opposing forces: (i) there is reallocation
of workers toward larger and higher productivity firms, which tend to be more stable and have






, both new and old exporters become more sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks,
which tends to increase turnover. We follow Coşar et al. (2016) and refer to these two forces as
the “distribution effect” and “sensitivity effect,” respectively. The bottom line is that increasing
openness can increase or decrease labor turnover depending on which of the two effects dominates.
Labor turnover is tightly linked to unemployment, as workers who are fired must spend at least
one period in unemployment. As a result, increasing openness can lead to increases or decreases
in unemployment. And, as explained in the previous paragraph, these unemployment changes will
generate corresponding changes in the share of informality.
2.7 Equilibrium
We now summarize the equilibrium conditions below. Online Appendices A to I give further details.
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1. Firms act optimally, make entry and exit decisions, and post vacancies according to equations
(13), (17), (18) and (19). If entry is positive in sector k, the free entry condition (20) holds
with equality.
2. Wage schedules solve the bargaining problem between workers and the firm, as in equations
(28) and (29).
3. Labor markets clear, that is, the sum of employment levels across sectors and firms types and
the number of unemployed workers must be equal to the total labor force L.
4. Product markets clear. The sum of expenditures in each sector, including consumption,
intermediate goods, costs of entry, hiring, and export costs must add up to revenues in the
sector. Where relevant, this includes payment of tariffs.
5. Trade is balanced: Imports = Exports.
6. The government runs a balanced budget. All government revenues stemming from tax col-
lection (including tariff revenues and fines on informal firms) and firing costs must exceed
expenditures with unemployment benefits to all unemployed workers dismissed from formal
employment. The budget surplus is directly rebated to consumers.
7. Aggregate income I is given by the sum of all wages and profits, plus the revenue from tariffs
(τa − 1)× Imports, minus the total costs incurred by entering and hiring firms, fixed costs of
operation and fixed costs of exporting.
8. We focus on steady state equilibria, where the distributions of states (z, `), by sector and firm
type, and all aggregate variables remain constant. In particular, no sector can be expanding
or contracting, which implies that: (i) the flow of workers out of unemployment and into the
formal/informal and tradable/non-tradable sectors must be the same as the flow out of these
sectors and into unemployment; (ii) the mass of firms entering the informal sector must be
equal to the mass of informal firms that decide to exit or to formalize their businesses in
either sector k ∈ {C, S}; and (iii) the sum of the number of firms entering the formal sector
and those formalizing their businesses must be equal to the mass of formal firms that decide
to exit either sector k ∈ {C, S}.
3 Background: The cost of labor regulations in Brazil
The relevant laws and regulations that apply to formal labor relations in Brazil are contained in the
Brazilian Labor Code (Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas—CLT). According to the employment
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index in Botero et al. (2004), the cost of labor regulations in Brazil is around 20 percent above the
mean and median of 85 countries and more than 2.5 times larger than in the United States.
The main aspects of labor regulations in Brazil regarding their magnitude and potential impacts
on the labor market, are: (i) the presence of a national minimum wage; (ii) unemployment insurance
that is only available to formal workers; (iii) substantial firing costs; and (iv) sizable payroll taxes.
Since these play an important role in our model and counterfactuals, we provide a brief background
discussion of each of them individually.
The nominal value of the national minimum wage is determined by the federal government
once a year and is typically binding for many firms. For instance, in 2003 (the year we use in our
empirical analysis), the minimum wage corresponds to 49 percent of the national average wage and
81.3 percent of the national median wage.9
While the unemployment insurance (UI) rules are complex, in practice, most workers receive UI
for 4 to 5 months and the value of the benefit depends on the worker’s average wage in the three
months before layoff. The replacement rate is 100 percent for individuals who earn one minimum
wage, with an average replacement rate of 64 percent (all data come from Gerard and Gonzaga,
forthcoming).10
As for the firing costs, the Brazilian labor regulation states that all formal workers with un-
justified dismissal should receive a monetary compensation paid by the employer. In Brazil (and
most Latin American countries), firms’ outcomes (e.g. lack of businesses) are not considered a just
cause for dismissal, thus any involuntary separation falls in this category (Heckman and Pagés,
2000). The magnitude of this compensation is determined as a fraction of the funds accumulated
in the worker’s Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (FGTS), which is a job security fund
proportional to job tenure and accumulates at a rate of roughly one monthly wage per year. Firms
hand over additional severance payments to workers and a direct “penalty” to the government,
which further increase the magnitude of the firing costs.11
Finally, Brazil has a burdensome tax system, which is characterized not only by high tax rates,
but also by a complex structure that implies large compliance costs. For instance, the time required
to comply with labor taxes in Brazil is almost 5 times higher than in the U.S. (491 and 100 hours,
9The mean and the median wages are computed using micro data from the National Household Survey (PNAD)
and pooling together all formal and informal employees who are between 18 and 64 years old and work at least 20
hours per week.
10We focus on the rules in place before the 2015 reforms since our empirical analysis precedes them.
11Gonzaga et al. (2003) provide an in depth discussion of the legislation on dismissal costs in Brazil.
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respectively).12
4 Data and Empirical Facts
We make use of seven datasets containing information on formal and informal firms and their
workers. An overview of these datasets and their main features is provided in Table 1. A key
source of information on formal-sector firms and workers is the Relação Anual de Informações
Sociais (RAIS), which is a matched employer-employee dataset assembled by the Brazilian Ministry
of Labor every year since 1976. RAIS is a high quality panel that contains the universe of formal
firms and workers.13 With these data, we can provide a detailed cross-sectional picture of the
formal labor market in the C and S sectors, as well as generate important longitudinal statistics
such as firm-level turnover and exit rates. We also make use of three firm-level surveys conducted
by the Brazilian National Statistics Agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat́ıstica, IBGE)
which cover the formal manufacturing, retail and service sectors: Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA),
Pesquisa Anual de Comércio (PAC), and Pesquisa Anual de Serviços (PAS), respectively. These
surveys collect detailed information on firms’ revenues and inputs, and combine a census of firms
above a certain size threshold with a representative sample of smaller firms. Longitudinal statistics
can be computed for firms surveyed in the census. We identify exporters in RAIS and PIA merging
these datasets with administrative customs records from Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (SECEX).
These five datasets provide a comprehensive view of the formal sector, but omit the informal
sector. Therefore, we use two additional data sources providing information on informal firms and
workers. First, the Pesquisa de Economia Informal Urbana (ECINF) is a cross-sectional survey
collected by IBGE in 2003, and was designed to be representative of the universe of urban firms
with up to five employees (both formal and informal).14 It is a matched employer-employee dataset
that contains information on entrepreneurs, their businesses and employees. Firms are directly
asked whether they are registered with the tax authorities and whether each of their workers has a
formal labor contract. It is therefore possible to directly observe both firms’ and workers’ formal
statuses. Given that the formality/informality statuses are self-reported, one could be concerned
with measurement error and under-reporting. However, IBGE has a long tradition of accurately
12These data come from Doing Business (2007), which is the earliest report available on paying taxes in the Doing
Business Initiative that provides comparability across a comprehensive set of countries.
13The RAIS dataset has been increasingly used in different applications. For recent examples see Dix-Carneiro
(2014), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017), Ulyssea (2018), among others.
14Although a few firms in the dataset have more than five employees, we restrict attention to those with five
employees or less so that our sample is consistent with the population the survey targets.
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Table 1: Summary of Datasets
Dataset Source Description
Relação Anual de Ministry of Labor Administrative matched employer-employee dataset.
Informações Sociais Covers all formal firms and workers. Detailed information
RAIS on firms and workers, but no information on firm-level revenues,
Years: 2003–2005 capital and expenditures with intermediate inputs.
Pesquisa Industrial IBGE Survey data on Manufacturing firms. Firm-level information
Anual such as revenues, capital, investment, expenditures with
PIA intermediate inputs, employment. Covers all firms with 30
Years: 2003, 2004 employees or more; random sample of smaller firms.
Pesquisa Anual dos IBGE Survey data on Service-sector firms. Firm-level
Serviços information such as revenues, capital, investment,
PAS expenditures with intermediate inputs, employment. Covers all firms
Years: 2003, 2004 with 20 employees or more; random sample of smaller firms.
Pesquisa Anual do IBGE Survey data on Retail and Commerce firms. Firm-level information
Comércio such as revenues, capital, investment, expenditures with
PAC intermediate inputs, employment. Covers all firms with 20
Years: 2003, 2004 employees or more; random sample of smaller firms.
Secretaria de Comércio Ministry of Administrative customs data. Export and import values at the
Exterior Industry, Foreign firm level.
SECEX Trade and Services
Year: 2003
Economia Informal IBGE Survey data. Matched employer-employee dataset with detailed
Urbana information on formal and informal firms and their workers.
ECINF Representative sample of small businesses (firms with 5 employees
Year: 2003 or less). Information on formal status of the firm and its workers.
Pesquisa Mensal IBGE Survey data. Rotating panel of households that covers the 6 main
de Emprego metropolitan areas in Brazil.
PME
Year: 2003
measuring labor informality, and has very strict confidentiality clauses. The information they
collect cannot be used for auditing purposes by other government branches, in particular those
responsible for enforcing the relevant laws and regulations. These characteristics, associated with
the high levels of informality observed in the data, make us confident that respondents are not
systematically underreporting their informality status.15
Finally, we draw from the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME)
to obtain information on worker allocations and labor market flows. This is a rotating panel
with a similar design to the Current Population Survey in the United States. The survey covers
the six main metropolitan areas in Brazil and contains detailed information on individuals’ socio-
demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes, including informal employment status.
We define a worker to be informal if she does not hold a formal labor contract—that variable is
explicitly recorded in PME. If a worker is self-employed, she is also treated as an informal worker.
15Additionally, Ulyssea (2018) shows that the ECINF survey reproduces very well the RAIS in all the dimensions
that are common to both datasets (e.g., size and sectoral distributions), which is reassuring of ECINF’s quality.
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Similarly, we treat self-employed workers in ECINF as informal firms employing one worker. We
exploit the panel structure of PME to estimate one-year labor market transitions between formal
employment, informal employment (in both C and S sectors) and unemployment status.16
We need to impose some restrictions to make these seven datasets consistent with each other.
First, because PME covers only six metropolitan regions, we restrict our samples to these regions
whenever possible. Given the focus on metropolitan regions in PME and urban firms in ECINF, we
remove firms and workers in agriculture, mining, coal, oil and gas industries. Second, we restrict
attention to data from 2003, as ECINF is only available for that year. Whenever we need to compute
dynamic statistics, we also employ data from 2004. Finally, we exclude firms in the public sector.
Our Data Appendix provides additional details regarding data treatment—see Online Appendix J.
We now highlight five important facts on formal and informal firms and workers in Brazil, which
we will target in our estimation procedure.17
Fact 1: Approximately 50% of the Brazilian labor force is informally employed. Tran-
sitions from unemployment to an informal job are at least twice as likely as transitions
from unemployment to a formal job.
Table 2 uses data from PME to establish that 48.2% of all workers are informally employed. If
we break down informality rates by sectors, we find that 35.6% of C-sector workers are informal,
compared to 51.2% in the S sector. Moreover, transition rates from unemployment to informal jobs
are twice as likely as those to formal jobs (45.3% compared to 21.1%).
Table 2: Employment Shares and Transition Rates
Transition Rates
Share of Workers From Unemp.
Informal Tradable (Ci) 0.059 0.064
Formal Tradable (Cf) 0.106 0.050
Informal Non-Tradable (Si) 0.351 0.389
Formal Non-Tradable (Sf) 0.334 0.161
Unemployment 0.150 0.336
Share of Informal Employment 0.482
Transition Rate from Unemp.
to Informal Employment 0.453
to Formal Employment 0.211
Ratio 2.146
Data source: 2003 PME.
Fact 2: The probability that a firm is informal declines sharply with its employment
16To minimize the effects of attrition in PME, we measure one-year transitions by annualizing four-month transi-
tions.
17See Ulyssea (2020) for a more extensive discussion of stylized facts related to informality.
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size.
We estimate, for each sector, regressions relating a firm-level informal status indicator to its
number of employees. Table 3 uses data from ECINF to show that the fraction of informal firms
rapidly declines with employment size.
Table 3: Firm-Level Informality Status vs. Firm-Level Employ-
ment
Dep. Variable: Informal Status Indicatori






Data source: 2003 ECINF. Standard errors in parentheses.
Fact 3: Informal firms are, on average, less productive than formal firms.
It has been widely documented that average productivity across firms in the informal sector
is substantially lower than in the formal sector. Our datasets confirm this insight. Note that the
sample of informal firms from ECINF cannot be directly compared with samples from PIA, PAS,
and PAC, as ECINF is designed to cover firms with at most five employees. However, we can
compare firm-level labor productivity (measured as revenue per worker) across formal and informal
firms by estimating linear regressions relating firm-level revenues to their employment size. The
idea is that once we condition on employment size, revenues of informal firms in ECINF can be
compared to those of equal-sized formal firms in PIA, PAS, and PAC. The linear regression results
reported in Panel A of Table 4 imply that, among C-sector firms of size one, formal firms are on
average more productive than informal ones by 1.73 log-points. For C-sector firms of size five, this
difference shrinks to 1.18 log-points. Similarly, for S-sector firms of size one, formal firms are, on
average, 1.18 log-points more productive than informal ones. Finally, for S-sector firms of size five,
this difference declines to 0.46 points.
Fact 4: The average informal worker is paid lower wages than the average formal
worker.
It is a well documented fact that average wages in the informal sector are on average lower
than those in the formal sector. Although RAIS provides information on firm-level wages for the
population of formal firms, we do not have have firm-level wages for the population of informal
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Table 4: Firm-Level log-Revenue per Worker and log-Wages vs. log-Employment
A. Dep. Variable: log(Revenuei/`i) B. Dep. Variable: log(wagei)
Sector / Firm Type Cf Sf Ci Si Cf Sf Ci Si
Intercept 10.118 10.004 8.391 8.825 8.509 8.436 8.013 8.417
(0.013) (0.005) (0.037) (0.015) (0.006) (0.002) (0.033) (0.014)
log(`i) 0.000 -0.128 0.342 0.321 0.117 0.105 0.292 0.231
(0.005) (0.003) (0.114) (0.050) (0.003) (0.001) (0.103) (0.048)
Exporteri (Dummy) 1.462 0.462
(0.021) (0.014)
Observations 16,986 43,861 1,070 6,202 20,075 145,981 1,071 6,205
Dataset





Standard errors in parentheses.
firms. ECINF contains wages of informal workers, but covers firms of size only up to five employees.
We compare wages across datasets by regressing log wages on log size for each type of firm in the
two sectors (C and S). Panel B of Table 4 shows that once we control for size, we see an important
informal wage penalty in the C sector, but not in the S sector. Formal C-sector firms of size one
tend to pay wages that are 0.5 log-points larger than their informal counterparts. For firms of size
five this difference declines to 0.21 log-points. On the other hand, S-sector firms of size one pay
roughly the same wages as their informal counterparts. Interestingly, if we condition on firms of
size five, the second and fourth columns of Panel B of Table 4 imply that informal firms firms pay,
on average, wages that are larger than their formal counterparts by 0.18 log-points. Still, because
informal firms tend to be considerably smaller than formal ones, an average informal worker receives
a lower wage than an average formal worker.
Fact 5: Firm-level labor turnover tends to decline with firm-level employment size.
However, conditional on size, exporters tend to have higher turnover.
As shown in Coşar et al. (2016), labor turnover tends to decline with firm size. However,
conditional on employment size, turnover tends to be larger for exporters. Table 5 reproduces
these findings for Brazil. These relationships play a central role in our quantitative exercise as
they gauge the importance of the redistribution and sensitivity effects highlighted in section 2.6 in
response to trade shocks.
5 Estimation
We quantify the model outlined in section 2 in two steps. First, we fix a subset of parameters
based on a combination of aggregate data, estimates from previous papers, and the statutory value
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Table 5: Turnover, Firm Size and Export Status
Dep. Variable: Turnoveri








Data Sources: 2003 and 2004 RAIS and 2003 SECEX. Turnover of firm




Standard errors in parentheses.
of institutional parameters, such as value-added and payroll taxes. Next, we estimate the remain-
ing parameters of the model using an Indirect Inference procedure, which allows us to combine
information from the different data sources discussed in the previous section. Section 5.1 describes
how we determine the parameters that are fixed throughout the estimation procedure. Section 5.2
discusses the estimation procedure, and section 5.3 addresses identification. Finally, section 5.4
presents the estimation results and discusses the fit of the model.
5.1 Fixed Parameters
As discussed in section 3, regulations are costly for employers, but they are complex. Therefore, we
need to make simplifying assumptions to map them to our model’s payroll tax (τw), value-added tax
(τy), firing cost (κ), and unemployment insurance benefit (bu). We follow Ulyssea (2018) and set τw
so that it reflects the main taxes that are proportional to firms’ wage bill, namely, the employers’
social security contribution (20 percent), payroll tax (9 percent), and severance contributions to
FGTS (8.5 percent). We combine two VAT-like taxes to calculate τy: Imposto sobre Produtos
Industrializados, IPI (20 percent) and PIS/COFINS (9.25 percent).18
Firing costs are set based on Heckman and Pages (2000), who compute the cost of dismissing
workers for several Latin American countries, including Brazil. Their calculation takes into account
the specific features of dismissal costs we reviewed in section 3 and show that, on average, employers
must pay approximately 1.9 months of wages to dismiss a worker. Considering that the annual
average formal-sector wage in the 2003 RAIS data amounts to R$10,565, we obtain a firing cost
κ of R$1,690 per worker. The minimum wage corresponds to the annualized value of the national
18We exclude state-level value-added taxes because these vary greatly across states and there is a complex system
of tax substitution across the production chain, which would be impossible to properly capture.
23
monthly minimum wage in 2003: w = R$2, 880. To compute unemployment insurance benefits,
we assume that all workers receive the maximum duration of potential benefits (that is, 5 monthly
payments). This figure is very close to both the mean and median of the duration of actually
received benefits (Gerard and Gonzaga, forthcoming). Finally, we use the average monthly value
of benefits paid in 2003, as reported by the Ministry of Labor: 1.37 times the minimum wage. This
amounts to unemployment insurance benefits bu = 1.37 × 5 times the monthly minimum wage =
R$1,644.
The share of final expenditure in sector C goods, ζ, and the share of sector k’s intermediate
inputs payments to sector C goods, λk, are extracted from the 2000 and 2005 Brazilian National
Accounts. We obtain ζ = 0.283, λC = 0.65, and λS = 0.29, suggesting that tariffs and iceberg
trade costs can have a substantial effect on labor productivity in both sectors. The iceberg trade
cost τc = 2.5 is obtained from Coşar et al. (2016), which is in turn based on estimates from Eaton
and Kortum (2002), and the average import tariff τa−1 = 0.12 comes from 2003 data in UNCTAD
TRAINS.
There are two sets of model parameters that are hard to identify given our data: the bargaining
weight of workers β, and the matching function parameters (φ and ξ)—see Flinn (2006) for a
discussion. We follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) and
impose symmetric bargaining, i.e. β = 0.5. We assume a matching function elasticity of ξ = 0.5,
which is in the middle of the range surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), and φ = 0.576,
a choice we discuss in section 5.3. Table 6 summarizes the parameter values fixed throughout the
estimation and their sources.
5.2 Estimation Procedure
We take the parameters described in Table 6 as given and estimate the remaining parameters using
an Indirect Inference procedure. In this step, we estimate 27 parameters using 84 data moments
and auxiliary model coefficients, ensuring that all equilibrium conditions listed in section 2.7 are
met throughout the procedure. The estimation algorithm is described in detail in Supplementary
Material I, but we highlight here a few important features of the procedure.
First, rewrite the value-added functions (7) and (33) as:









Table 6: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Description Source Value
τc Iceberg Trade Cost Coşar et al. (2016) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) 2.50
ζ Share of final expend. on C IBGE National Accounts (2000/2005) 0.283
λC Prod. Function (Equation (4)) IBGE National Accounts (2000/2005) 0.645
λS Prod. Function (Equation (4)) IBGE National Accounts (2000/2005) 0.291
r Interest rate Ulyssea (2010) 0.08
τy Value Added Tax Ulyssea (2018) 0.293
τw Payroll Tax Ulyssea (2018) 0.375
τa − 1 Import Tariff UNCTAD TRAINS 0.12
κ Firing Costs (in R$) Heckman and Pages (2000) 1,956.7
w Min. Wage (in R$) Annualized 2003 value 2,880
bu Unemployment Benefit 1.37× 5 = 6.85 monthly Min. Wage 1,644
ξ Matching Function Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) 0.5
φ Matching Function Own Calculations, see section 5.3 0.576
β Workers’ Bargaining Weight Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) 0.5
Parameters based on the IBGE National Accounts employ simple averages between 2000 and 2005.




Λk for k = C, S.19 Also, define ϑJu ≡ b + 11+rJ
u, to
be the expected discounted present value of unemployment. The estimation procedure treats the
endogenous equilibrium objects ΨC , ΨS , and ϑJu as “parameters” to be estimated.
20 Given a
guess of these objects and of the remaining structural parameters, we are able to solve for the mass
of entrants, the mass of active firms, the firm-level policy functions, the steady-state distribution
of states, and the unemployment rate that are consistent with these guesses. To be precise, we




∣∣mModeli (Ω)−mDatai ∣∣, where Ω denotes the set
of parameters to be estimated, mDatai denotes the values of moments or auxiliay model coefficients
measured in the data, mModeli (Ω) denotes the values of moments or auxiliary model coefficients
generated by the model when the set of parameters is given by Ω, and Wi weighs the importance of
moment i in the loss function. Ω includes the endogenous objects ΨC , ΨS , and ϑJu , but excludes
the structural parameters b and D∗F , which are obtained after the minimization of L is complete. It
also excludes parameters δk (k = C, S), which are directly determined as functions of the elasticities
of substitutions σk and the share of gross revenues devoted to intermediate goods payments using:
δk = 1− σkσk−1
(




, where the term in parenthesis is computed











and Λk ≡ σk−1σk−(1−δk)(σk−1) are sector-specific constants; P
m
k is the price









are domestic demand shifters.
20In counterfactual simulations, these are solved out under the new environment. Estimation relies on the assump-
tion that the data comes from an equilibrium allocation.
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shifter dF . Given a guess of σC , it can be directly recovered using equation (32) and data on the
average share of exporters’ gross revenues that is actually exported (which is obtained from PIA
and SECEX).
Once the minimization of L over Ω is concluded, the utility of unemployment is recovered using:




where Ju can be computed using equation (A.48) in the Online Appendix. In turn, D∗F is recovered
as:
D∗F =







where ε is the exchange rate value that balances trade and PmC is the price of one unit of sector C’s
intermediate bundle.
We emphasize that the only differences between formal and informal firms are that the former
are subject to regulations and taxes, and the latter face an expected cost of informality Kinf (z, `′).
Otherwise, they have access to the same production and hiring technologies, and are subject to the
same exogenous exit rates. However, these parameter restrictions do not significantly affect the
final fit of the model.
5.3 Identification
To understand which moments in the data identify the parameters we estimate, first rewrite the












, for k = C, S. Our
estimation procedure treats h̃k as a “parameter” to be estimated. This term is identified based on
the average level of turnover rates at the firm level as well as the unemployment rate, given that
the two are closely related.21 The auxiliary (linear) model relating firm-level turnover rates to log-
employment and an export indicator gives information on the scale economies γk2. The auxiliary
(linear) model relating log-wages to log-employment and an export indicator gives information
on the convexity of hiring costs γk1, as it relates to wage dispersion across firms with different
characteristics.
Note that h̃k is a combination of a structural parameter hk with an endogenous term µ
υ. Fol-
lowing the estimation of h̃k and γk1, we recover hk by imposing that µ
υ = 0.5 in the equilibrium
we estimate.22 In turn, we set φ so that we perfectly match the yearly transition rate from unem-
21In our model, worker separations are followed by a period of unemployment. This mechanically ties turnover
rates to unemployment rates.
22Similarly to how we treat ΨC , ΨS , and ϑJu , µ
υ is solved out in our subsequent counterfactual exercises.
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ployment to employment in the data.23
The model needs the fixed costs of production ck to match how the probability of firm-level
exit rates depends on size. Exogenous destruction rates αk are needed to match the average exit
rates. Matching the relationship between firm-level revenues and firm size gives information on
σk. The AR(1) process for productivity is pinned down by targeting two dynamic moments: the
serial correlation in firm-level employment, and the serial correlation in firm-level revenues. The
cross-sectional dispersions in firm-level employment size and revenues are also informative about
the variance of shocks σzk. The share of C-sector firms that export pins down the fixed cost of
exporting fx.




is identified by matching the firm-
size distribution in the informal sector, the share of employment in the informal sector, and the
fraction of informal firms conditional on employment size. All the moments and auxiliary models
used in the estimation procedure (as well as the datasets we have used to compute each of them)
are listed in Appendix K.
5.4 Estimation Results
5.4.1 Estimates
Table 7 presents our parameter estimates. Informality costs as a fraction of revenues, pki(`), differ
across sectors. In the C sector, the informality costs start at a relatively low value, but rapidly
increase with size. On the other hand, the informality penalty starts at a larger value in the S
sector, but increases with size at a slower pace. The different derivatives of the informality penalty
function in the C and S sectors are intuitive, as one would expect large manufacturing firms to
face increasing hurdles to remain invisible to the government.
Our hiring function estimates display convexity (γ1C = 2.1, γ
1
S = 4.9) and scale economies
(γ2C = 0.14, γ
2
S = 0.19) in both sectors. These results are in the same ballpark as recent estimates
from Coşar et al. (2016), who use data from Colombia. Similarly, our estimates of the elasticities
of substitution in the C and S sectors, given respectively by σC = 5.3, and σS = 3.3, are within
the range of earlier papers (see, for example, Coşar et al., 2016; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012;










. We choose φ so that our model perfectly matches the transition from unemployment
to employment in the data, TransitionU→EData , conditional on µ




0.576, as shown in Table 6.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description k = C k = S
ãk Cost of Informality, Intercept 0.161 0.373
b̃k Cost of Informality, Convexity 0.131 0.013
hk Hiring Cost, Level 559.7 2348.9
γ1k Hiring Cost, Convexity 2.067 4.896
γ2k Hiring Cost, Scale Economies 0.139 0.192
σk Elasticity of Substitution 5.321 3.281
ρk Productivity AR(1) Process, Persistence Coeff. 0.978 0.977
σzk Productivity AR(1) Process, Variance of Shock 0.199 0.296
αk Exogenous Exit Probability 0.067 0.063
ck Fixed Cost of Operation 23.071 27.047
δk Labor Share in Production 0.266 0.54
cek Entry Cost 5,332.2 2,067.1
fx Fixed Cost of Exporting 55,856.9
b Utility Value of Unemployment -8,662.5
(D∗F )
1
σC Foreign Demand Shifter 969.2
De Loecker et al., 2016; Broda and Weinstein, 2006). In particular, our estimates are consistent with
Gervais and Jensen (2019) who find that services have elasticities of substitution about one-quarter
smaller than manufacturing.
Finally, we estimate a negative value for b, implying a significant disutility of unemployment.
Our estimate of -8,662.5 is equivalent to 3 times the 2003 minimum wage. As a benchmark, also
in the context of a search model, Meghir et al. (2015) estimate a negative b for men in the São
Paulo metropolitan region equal to 4.3 times the 2008 minimum wage.24 As the search literature
has shown, a negative value of unemployment is necessary to generate the magnitudes of wage
dispersion typically found in the data (see, for example, Hornstein et al., 2011).
5.4.2 Model Fit
Tables A.2 through A.8 in Online Appendix K compare how our model-generated moments and
auxiliary model coefficients compare to those obtained in the data. Overall, our model with 27
structural parameters fits our 84 target data moments or auxiliary model coefficients well. Impor-
tantly, Facts 1 through 5 highlighted in section 4 are all well matched. Specifically, Table A.2 shows
that employment shares and transition rates from unemployment are on target, so that our model
comfortably replicates Fact 1. The sharp relationship between informal status and size (Fact 2) is
also well reproduced by our model, as shown in the lower panel of Table A.8. Tables A.6 and A.8
24Table 5 in their paper estimates a (monthly) flow value of unemployment of -1,308 for men in São Paulo. The
average monthly minimum wage during the period they consider is of R$ 300.
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show that average wages in the formal sector indeed exceed those in the informal sector, mirroring
Fact 4. Fact 5, relating firm-level turnover to size and export status, is also well replicated as
Table A.3 shows. Also noteworthy is the ability of the model to match how turnover rates relate
to employment and export status conditional on both expansions and contractions. We do not
directly target Fact 3, but we verify that the model implies that less productive firms tend to sort
into informal status. Finally, Table A.6 shows that the model recreates the strong wage size and
exporter premia found in the data, in both sectors. These are important moments to replicate, as
they give us confidence in the wage inequality counterfactuals we conduct in section 6.1.5.
Having discussed the successes of the model, we now turn to the moments that were not as
well matched, and discuss reasons for some of these mismatches. Although the model is able to
replicate very well the dependence between firm-level turnover rates, firm-level employment, and
export status, the average turnover rate is not as well replicated. There was a tension between
matching the level of turnover rates and matching the unemployment rate.
Our model also tends to underestimate the dispersion of firm size in the formal sector, in both
sectors C and S (see Table A.4). We hypothesize two reasons for this discrepancy. First, the data
source we employ has a thicker than usual left tail of the firm-size distribution.25 Second, the
assumed normal distribution of productivity shocks naturally makes it harder to match the right
tail of the size distribution. Although modelling firm-level dynamics according to equation (5) is
standard in the literature (see Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Alessandria and Choi, 2014; Coşar
et al., 2016, among many others), we would need a more flexible specification for the productivity
process in order to better match the firm-size distribution in Brazil.26 Relatedly, the dispersion in
revenues in Table A.7 is also under-estimated.
Finally, we overestimate average productivity/revenues among informal C-sector firms. Al-
though we have a fairly detailed grid of productivity, with 41 points, the grid tends to be sparse at
low productivity levels, leading to jumps in average productivity in the informal sector in response
to small shifts in parameters.27 Still, our model-generated moments are consistent with the fact
that informal firms are, on average, substantially smaller and less productive than formal firms.
25The 20th and 40th percentiles of firm size in the formal C sector are given by, respectively, 2 and 4. In the formal
S sector, these are 1 and 2.
26Although standard in the literature, imposing log-normality can have important quantitative implications for the
gains from integration, as discussed in Adão et al. (2020a).
27We use Tauchen’s method (Tauchen, 1986) to discretize the Markov process described in equation(5).
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6 Counterfactual Experiments
6.1 The Effects of Trade under Informality
We study the quantitative implications of our model for the relationship between openness and
informality, unemployment, welfare, productivity and wage inequality. We focus on changes in
iceberg trade costs τc, as the effects of tariffs τa were found to be relatively small (results are
available upon request). The modest tariff effects are due to the fact that the initial trade costs
(τc = 2.5) in 2003 are high, while the initial tariff levels are relatively low (ca. 12%). Our
counterfactual experiments consider four levels of τc: 1.5; 2; 2.5 (benchmark in 2003); and 6.
The τc = 6 case represents a near autarky scenario, while τc = 1.5 represents a significant move
toward international integration.28 We solve the model setting the S sector composite good as
the numeraire (that is, the price index PS is fixed across counterfactuals). Therefore, all nominal
parameters (including the minimum wage w) are expressed in terms of the S sector composite good.
All details of the simulation algorithm are available in Supplementary Material II.
6.1.1 Trade and Informality
We first investigate the effects of openness on the size of the informal sector. Figure 3 shows the
effects of τc on the share of employment in the informal C and S sectors, as well as on the overall
share of informal employment in the economy. We observe a strong negative relationship between
openness and informality in the C sector. Specifically, if trade costs are reduced from τc = 2.5
to τc = 1.5, the share of employment in the informal C sector declines from 8.1% to 3.6%—
a 55% reduction in the importance of the informal C sector for total employment. Conversely,
if trade costs increased to near-autarky levels, the share of workers employed in the informal C
sector would increase from 8.1% to 10%—a 21% increase. These responses of the informal sector
to increased openness are broadly consistent with the empirical results of McCaig and Pavcnik
(2018). They show that the Vietnamese manufacturing sectors that benefitted the most from
tariff reductions resulting from the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement experienced
substantial increases in formal-sector employment relative to other sectors.
What is behind this sharp relationship between openness and the size of the informal C sector?
As openness increases, international competition in sector C intensifies, reducing demand for purely
28Such a large decrease (ca. 40%) in trade costs is not implausible. Indeed, Dix-Carneiro et al. (2020) find that
non-service goods import trade costs in Asia have declined by up to 40% between 2000 and 2014.
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domestic C sector firms (which include all informal firms). This reduction in demand pushes low-
productivity formal firms to informality, but it also drives low-productivity informal firms out of
the market. The total effect of openness on informality depends on the relative magnitude of these
two forces. Empirically, selection at the left tail of the distribution of informal firms dominates,
leading to the strong negative relationship between openness and informality in the manufacturing
sector.
Interestingly, the effect of openness on informality in the S sector is very different. Increases in
openness from the benchmark lead to increases in the size of the informal S sector. The increase we
observe as τc is reduced from 2.5 to 2 is quite substantial: the size of the informal S sector climbs
from 41.7% to 48.2% of total employment—a 16% increase. Whereas openness reduces demand to
purely domestic C-sector firms, it increases demand for S-sector firms for two reasons. First, real
income increases with openness (as we show in section 6.1.3), resulting in an increase in demand
for S sector goods for final consumption. Second, exporters and other productive firms in the C
sector expand, leading to increased demand for intermediate goods produced by the S sector. This
increase in demand encourages productive informal S-sector firms to expand and formalize, but it
also encourages entry of low-productivity informal firms. Empirically, the latter effect dominates.
Figure 3 shows that, as we put the C and S sectors together, we find an inverse U-shaped
relationship between the importance of informal employment and openness, as τc is reduced from
2.5 to 1.5. For moderate declines in τc, the positive effect of openness on informality in S dominates.
However, for further declines in τc, the negative impact on informality in C tends to offset the former
effect, so that the effect on informality as a whole is not economically significant. Finally, as the
economy moves toward autarky, the positive effect on informality in the C sector dominates, and
we observe a modest increase in the share of informal employment.


















































6.1.2 Trade and Unemployment
Next, we focus on the effect of openness on unemployment, which we display in the left panel of
Figure 4. As τc is reduced from 2.5 to 1.5, the unemployment rate increases from 18.3% to 19.4%.
This represents an increase of 6% in the total number of unemployed workers. A key driving
force behind this increase in unemployment is the sensitivity effect discussed in section 2.6. As τc
declines, we observe: (1) a shift in the size distribution in both C and S sectors toward larger firms;
and (2) a shift in employment toward exporters, who experience increases in the demand they face.
Effect (1) implies the distribution effect, whereby aggregate turnover should decline as larger firms
tend to have lower turnover—see Fact 5 in section 4. Indeed, turnover in the S sector does decline
according to our results. However, effect (2) implies the sensitivity effect, which can dominate the
distribution effect if the increases in foreign demand and fraction of exporters are large enough.
We find that, as a consequence of a strong sensitivity effect, turnover in the C sector increases with
openness. Finally, note that the distribution effect in the S sector (which is over four times the size
of the C sector in terms of total employment) prevents the effect of openness on total turnover and
unemployment of being even larger. This observation highlights the importance of incorporating
and carefully modeling the S sector when we study the aggregate implications of trade shocks.29
To conclude, we note that unemployment increases as the economy moves toward autarky. In this
case, the driving force behind the increase in unemployment is the decline in aggregate real income,
and, therefore, in the demand faced by firms in both sectors. As we will see in section 6.3, the
informal sector cushions the effect of the move to autarky on unemployment.

















































Notes: Real Income refers to the real value of the sum of all wages and profits in the economy. Real Income 2 refers to the
real value of the sum of all wages and profits in the economy including the disutility of unemployment b× Lu. Real Income
and Real Income 2 are both normalized at 1 for τc = 2.5.
29Most studies of trade with heterogeneous firms carefully model the manufacturing sector, but abstract from firm
heterogeneity and frictions in the services sector.
32
6.1.3 Trade and Welfare
We now turn our attention to the impact of trade on welfare. We focus on two measures of welfare:
Real Income, which is the indirect utility derived from equation (1), and real income minus the
disutility associated with unemployment (we refer to the second measure as Real Income 2). The
middle and right panels of Figure 4 present how these two measures of welfare depend on the level
of openness. Note that the welfare measures are normalized at 1 for τc = 2.5.
Regardless of the welfare measure we consider, we find that openness is positively related to
welfare. Moving the economy toward autarky reduces Real Income by 2.5% and Real Income 2 by
3.9%. On the other hand, reducing trade costs to τc = 1.5 leads to welfare increases between 21%
and 23%. Large increases in productivity, through the reallocation of labor toward larger and more
productive firms, drive these large welfare effects—despite the increase in unemployment.
6.1.4 Trade and Productivity
We turn to the effect of openness on aggregate Total Factor Productivity (TFP), and examine
how it depends on incorporating the informal sector. We compute aggregate TFP within each
sector as employment-weighted averages of firms’ idiosyncratic productivities z. Figure 5 shows
how aggregate TFP behaves in response to increasing openness within each sector. We normalize
aggregate TFP to 1 at τc = 2.5.
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Notes: Aggregate TFP is computed as the weighted average of the z’s of all active firms—weights are given by firm-level
employment. Aggregate TFP in each situation is normalized at 1 for τc = 2.5.
As expected, we find that reductions in τc lead to increases in aggregate TFP in the formal
C sector; a reduction of τc all the way to 1.5 results in a productivity increase of 12%. However,
this increase in formal-sector aggregate productivity is considerably smaller than the increase in
productivity in the C sector as a whole (including both formal and informal firms), which amounts
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to 32%. This result suggests that studies focusing on the effect of trade on productivity using formal-
sector data sources only (as most do) can significantly underestimate the aggregate productivity
gains of trade. The main reason for this discrepancy is that trade drives highly unproductive
informal C sector firms out of the market, freeing up resources to be reallocated to more productive
formal ones.
The opposite pattern is found in the S sector, albeit at a much smaller scale. The effect of
openness on overall S sector aggregate productivity is smaller than the effect on the formal S sector.
As we noted before, as τc is reduced, demand faced by S sector firms increases, inducing highly
unproductive informal S sector firms to enter. This entry mitigates the aggregate productivity gain
we observe in the formal S sector. Overall, bundling the C and S sectors together, a reduction in
τc from 2.5 to 1.5 leads to an increase in aggregate TFP of 7.6% in the formal sector, whereas this
increase amounts to 9.6% once we incorporate the informal sector.
Interestingly, aggregate TFP among formal firms increases in both sectors as the economy moves
toward autarky. As real income decreases with autarky, resources are partially reallocated toward
less productive firms pushing aggregate TFP in the formal sector down. However, at the same
time, low-productivity formal firms are driven out of the market, which drives aggregate TFP in
the formal sector up through a selection effect. However, if we measure aggregate TFP across all
firms, formal and informal, we observe a decline in aggregate TFP as resources move toward smaller
and less productive firms.
6.1.5 Trade and Wage Inequality
A large literature in International Trade has focused on the effect of openness on wage inequality.
We revisit these impacts in the context of our model. Note that, in our model, wage inequality
is driven by differences across firms, given that workers are homogeneous, and not by differential
exposure of heterogeneous workers to trade. In this regard, we follow an important stream of the
literature that includes, among others, Helpman et al. (2010) and Coşar et al. (2016). For studies
relating trade to wage inequality driven by heterogeneous workers, see Costinot and Vogel (2010),
Adão (2016), Galle et al. (2020), and Adão et al. (2020b) among others.
Figure 6 shows how the standard deviation of log-wages (across workers) behaves as we change
τc. As we reduce τc from 2.5 to 1.5, our measure of wage inequality within the formal C sector
increases by 10%. This increase in wage inequality within the formal sector occurs because the de-
mand experienced by exporters—which tend to be larger and pay higher wages—increases, whereas
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the demand faced by purely domestic firms decreases. This in turn raises the wage premium paid
by exporters, increasing wage dispersion within the formal C sector.






















































































The increase in inequality within the formal C sector in response to openness is qualitatively
consistent with earlier findings (e.g., Helpman et al., 2016; Coşar et al., 2016, on Brazil and Colom-
bia, respectively). However, if we focus on the informal sector, we observe a decline in wage
inequality.30 As we discussed in section 6.1.1, a trade cost reduction decreases demand for purely
domestic firms. As a result, low-productivity firms that would otherwise be formal, become in-
formal. This shift tends to amplify wage inequality within the informal sector as these firms pay
relatively higher wages within that sector. However, low-paying informal firms at the bottom of
the productivity distribution exit the market, compressing wage dispersion. The net effect of these
forces is a reduction in wage inequality. Importantly, as we consider wage inequality across all
workers (formal and informal) within the C sector, we obtain a different picture from the one
documented in the literature. Reductions in τc are associated with declines in wage inequality: as
τc is reduced from 2.5 to 1.5, wage inequality declines by ca. 4.6% within the C sector. As with
our results on productivity, these findings highlight the importance of incorporating the informal
sector in analyses of trade and wage inequality.
30This result seems to conflict with the findings in Adão et al. (2020b). However, Adão et al. (2020b) focus on a
different measure of inequality, namely earnings inequality across heterogeneous workers. We remind the reader that
wage inequality in our model is solely driven by differences across firms.
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To understand these effects, it is helpful to use the law of total variance, and write:
V ar (logw|k) =
∑
j∈{f,i}
pkjV ar (logw|kj) +
∑
j∈{f,i}
pkj (E [logw|kj]− E [logw|k])2 , (36)
where V ar (logw|k) is the variance of log-wages across all workers within sector k, and V ar (logw|kj)
is the variance of log-wages across workers employed by firms with formality status j in sector k.
Similarly, E [logw|k] is the average of log-wages across all workers within sector k, and E [logw|kj]




, where Lkj denotes total employment in firms of type j in sector k.
Appendix L shows how the different components of equation (36) behave as trade costs are
reduced. Both the variance of log-wages within the formal C sector and its weight pCf increase (as
Figure 6 and Figure 3 respectively show). On the other hand, the variance of log-wages within the
informal C sector declines, but so does its weight pCi. On net, the first term on the right hand
side of equation (36) slightly increases. However, the variance between the two groups—given by
the second term of equation (36)—declines with τc, leading to a decrease in the total variance of
log-wages within the C sector with openness (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). This between-group
effect occurs because the distance between E [logw|Cf ] and E [logw|Ci] decreases. Furthermore,
as workers are reallocated to the formal sector, E [logw|Cf ]− E [logw|C] declines, but its weight
in (36), pCf , increases.
Figure 6 shows that wage inequality within the formal sector S sector also increases as we reduce
τc. As trade costs are reduced, demand for S sector firms increases, leading to the formalization
of the most productive informal firms and to entry into the formal sector at the left tail of formal-
sector productivity (which often pays minimum wages). This reallocation results in more dispersion
in wages in the formal sector. In the informal S sector, we have entry of unproductive, low-paying,
informal firms and exit (to formality) of productive, (relatively) high-paying, informal firms. On
net, this leads to an increase in wage inequality within the informal S sector as well. However,
the between group component declines as the difference in average log-wages in the two sectors
E [logw|Sf ] and E [logw|Si] declines. This between-group effect dominates, so that overall wage
inequality within the S sector declines. As the share of employment in the high-inequality C sector
declines from 18% at τc = 2.5 to 13.3% at τc = 1.5, the resulting effect is that, as trade costs
decline, wage inequality in the economy as a whole also declines.
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6.1.6 Taking Stock
Incorporating the informal sector in the analysis of the effects of trade leads to several important
insights. First, increasing openness strongly reduces informal employment in the tradable sector.
However, the behavior of informality in the non-tradable sector is different. Given that employment
in the non-tradable sector is more than four times larger than employment in the tradable sector,
incorporating and carefully modeling the non-tradable sector is of first-order importance. We find
that for small reductions in trade costs, the share of informal employment increases, but for further
reductions, it reverts to a level close to the starting point. This result may explain why—despite
the rapid integration of developing countries in world markets in the past three decades—informal
employment has failed to substantially decline (see World Bank, 2019).
Second, our counterfactual analysis demonstrates that the sensitivity effect, whereby employ-
ment amongst exporters is more sensitive to shocks, is quantitatively important and drives increases
in the unemployment rate as trade costs are reduced. As before, modeling the non-tradable sector is
important for the quantitative results. In the non-tradable sector, turnover is reduced as resources
are reallocated to larger and more stable firms when trade costs decline. This effect counteracts
the increase in turnover in the tradable sector, and, consequently, attenuates the effect of trade on
unemployment. Despite the increase in unemployment, our model predicts that a 40% reduction
in trade costs leads to welfare gains of 21%.
Third, we show that the total effect of openness on the tradable sector aggregate TFP can be up
to 2.7 times larger if we incorporate the informal sector into the analysis. This result is important as
the literature estimating the productivity gains from trade in developing countries invariably relies
on information on formal firms only. Interestingly, we find the opposite pattern in the non-tradable
sector: aggregate productivity gains in the formal non-tradable sector overestimate overall gains,
but the magnitude of the discrepancy is much smaller than the one we find in the tradable sector.
Finally, our analysis corroborates previous results in the literature that openness in developing
countries increases wage inequality across workers in the formal sector. However, we find that this
effect is reversed once we take into account the informal sector. This suggests that research on
the effects of trade on wage inequality in environments with large informal sectors (as in most
developing economies) needs to explicitly model and account for informality.
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6.2 Effects of Trade when the Informal Sector is Repressed
This section investigates the effects of trade on labor market outcomes and welfare when the
informal sector is repressed. We consider two scenarios. First, we focus on a stricter enforcement
policy where the convexity of the cost of informality is increased. As Meghir et al. (2015) discuss,
this is equivalent to a monitoring policy where attention is disproportionally devoted to larger (and
more visible) informal firms. Specifically, we choose b̃k so that pki(` = 6) = 1 for k = C, S, while
maintaining the ãk parameters at the estimated values in Table 7. This means that firms with six
or more employees face an expected penalty equal to or larger than their current revenues.31 The
shifts in the cost of informality are illustrated in Figure 7. Second, we consider a scenario where no
informal firm is allowed: a full informality ban. Although extreme and unlikely to be achievable in
practice, this is a theoretically interesting paradigm to contemplate through the lens of our model.
Figure 7: Costs of Informality: Benchmark and Stricter Enforcement
















Notes: pCi(`) and pSi(`) are plotted against ` under the benchmark case and under the stricter enforcement policy.
Table 8 shows the effects of these policies conditional on the benchmark value of trade costs τc =
2.5. First, the Stricter Enforcement policy substantially reduces the share of informal employment
from 50% to 36%. The increase in the convexity of the cost of informality leads to the extiction of
informal firms of size 3 or larger, but many informal firms of size 1 and 2 are still profitable. As
informality is repressed, aggregate TFP in sector C increases by 8.5%, whereas aggregate TFP in
sector S is roughly unchanged. Perhaps curiously, real value added per worker declines by 6% in
the S sector and is essentially unchanged in sector C. As informality is repressed, the mass of firms
operating in the C sector (NC = NCf +NCi) decreases by almost 20%. Given our CES aggregators
(see equation (2)), the price of the C composite good increases, despite higher aggregate TFP in
31We obtain b̃C = 0.203 and b̃S = 0.109 compared to the estimated benchmark values b̃C = 0.131 and b̃S = 0.013.
We have experimented with other changes in the convexity of the cost of informality, leading to similar conclusions
to those reported here.
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the sector. Given the importance of C goods as intermediate inputs in both sectors, intermediate
goods prices PmC and P
m
S increase in both sectors, subsequently reducing intermediate input usage
and labor productivity. To conclude, we observe that the Stricter Enforcement policy has little
effect on unemployment, but leads to a decline in real income of 5%.
Table 8: Effects of Increasing the Cost of Informality
Stricter No
Benchmark Enforcement Informality
Unemployment Rate 0.183 0.184 0.326
Share Emp. Ci 0.081 0.050 0
Share Emp. Cf 0.100 0.124 0.201
Share Emp. Si 0.417 0.313 0
Share Emp. Sf 0.402 0.514 0.799
Share Informal Emp. 0.498 0.362 0
NC = NCf +NCi 1 0.813 0.268
NS = NSf +NSi 1 1.137 0.574
Aggregate TFP C 1 1.085 1.317
Real V.A. per worker C 1 0.988 0.856
Aggregate TFP S 1 0.993 1.397
Real V.A. per worker S 1 0.940 0.987
PmC 1 1.030 1.061
PmS 1 1.013 1.027
Real Income 1 0.950 0.787
Real Income 2 1 0.938 0.541
Notes: Real Income refers to the real value of the sum of all wages and profits in the economy. Real
Income 2 refers to the real value of the sum of all wages and profits in the economy including the
disutility of unemployment b × Lu. Aggregate TFP is computed as the weighted average of the z’s
of all active firms—weights are given by firm-level employment. V.A. stands for value added. All
variables below line 6 are normalized relative to Benchmark values.
Turning to the No Informality policy, Table 8 shows that it substantially increases aggregate
TFP, by over 30%, in both sectors. However, the unemployment rate shoots up, from 18.3%
to 32.6%. As informality is no longer “allowed,” previously low-productivity low-wage informal
firms need to formalize to be able to operate. As these firms formalize, the minimum wage they
are required to pay sharply reduces their profitability, leading to massive exit and a surge in the
unemployment rate. Indeed, under the No Informality scenario, the minimum wage binds for
over 50% of workers in both the C and S sectors (compared to 4% and 18.6% in the C and S
sectors, respectively, in the benchmark scenario). As a consequence of this steep increase in the
unemployment rate, welfare falls by 20% in response to this policy (and by ca. 50%, if one accounts
for the disutility of unemployment).
One of the main justifications policy makers give for repressing informality is to increase ag-
gregate productivity (Perry et al., 2007). The results in Table 8 demonstrate that this is indeed
the case: lower informality implies higher TFP. But this happens at the expense of welfare. It is
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interesting to contrast the effects of policies repressing informality to the effects of trade. As we
discussed in the previous section, trade also increases productivity. But it does so while increasing
welfare and reducing wage inequality. The trade effects are sizable: a 30% increase in TFP in the
C sector requires a 40% reduction of trade costs (from 2.5 to 1.5), while welfare increases by ca.
20%. In contrast, a similar TFP increase through informality repression can only be achieved if
welfare declines by ca. 20%.
We next investigate the effects of openness on informality, unemployment and welfare for each
of the two scenarios considered in Table 8. Figure 8 shows the effect of τc on the size of the informal
sector within C and S as well as on the overall share of informal employment. Regardless of the
scenario we consider, increasing openness leads to sizable declines in informality in the C sector.
However, the effects of openness on informality in the S sector are more nuanced. As previously
explained, τc reductions cause: (a) an increase in the demand faced by exporters in C; (b) a decline
in the demand faced by purely domestic firms in C; (c) an increase in the demand faced by firms
in S. The increase in the demand faced by firms in S has in turn two effects: it encourages
the formalization of relatively productive informal firms—which tends to reduce informality in the
sector; and it encourages entry of unproductive informal firms at the bottom of the productivity
distribution—which tends to increase informality in the sector. Figure 8 shows that the dominating
force between these two mechanisms depends on the exact economic scenario we consider. The figure
shows that as informality is repressed, the incentives for entry at the left tail of the productivity
distribution are reduced.













































Notes: All variables are normalized relative to their values at τc = 2.5.
Figure 9 investigates the implications of openness for unemployment across the scenarios we
consider. Two distinct patterns are noticeable. First, increased openness leads to a substantial
increase in unemployment when we focus on the Stricter Enforcement policy: the unemployment
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rate jumps from 18.3% to 22.2%—or a 20% jump in the number of unemployed workers. As in
the benchmark case, the sensitivity effect is the key driver. Turnover in the C sector increases,
especially within the formal C sector. Given that the informal sector is repressed, transitions
from unemployment to informality are much less frequent than under the benchmark, leading to an
increase in the persistence in unemployment and, subsequently, to a larger effect on unemployment.
Specifically, under Stricter Enforcement, the yearly job-finding rate from unemployment declines
from 56.8% (with τc = 2.5) to 48.1% (with τc = 1.5). Second, openness leads to a decline in
unemployment when we turn to the No Informality policy: the unemployment rate declines from
32.5% to 29.5%—or a 10% reduction in the number of unemployed workers. The sensitivity effect is
still in action, but an opposing force dominates. As openness increases, real income and wages also
rise, making the minimum wage less binding, thereupon leading to a decline in unemployment.32











































Notes: All variables are normalized relative to their values at τc = 2.5. Real Income refers to the real value of the sum of all
wages and profits in the economy. Real Income 2 refers to the real value of the sum of all wages and profits in the economy
including the disutility of unemployment b× Lu.
Lastly, we investigate how the gains from trade depend on policies repressing the informal sec-
tor. Figure 9 reveals that, as τc is reduced from 2.5 to 2, the gains from trade under the Benchmark
are 4.7%. These gains are approximately 100% larger than under the Stricter Enforcement or No
Informality policies (which amount to 2.2% and 2.5%, respectively). As τc is further reduced from
2.5 to 1.5, the gains from trade under the benchmark reach 21%, and, under Stricter Enforcement,
19%. However, the gains under the No Informality policy jump to 24%. The main reason be-
hind this larger jump is the strong decline in unemployment we see under this scenario, whereas
unemployment tends to increase in the remaining scenarios.
Focusing on the other extreme, the losses from autarky are relatively modest in the scenarios
we consider. The exception is the No Informality case, in which moving toward autarky leads to a
32Over 50% of all wages are binding with τc = 2.5, but only 40% are binding with τc = 1.5.
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substantial increase in unemployment, resulting in a 9.3% decline in Real Income. The conclusion
is that the gains from trade (and losses from autarky) significantly depend on the economic policies
regarding informality. For small reductions in τc, gains can differ by as much as 100%. For large
reductions in τc, the gains are more homogeneous, but still range between 19.4% and 24.4%.
6.3 The Informal Sector as a Buffer
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019) show that, as a result of the trade liberalization episode of the
1990s, Brazilian regions that were more exposed to foreign competition experienced increases in
unemployment in the medium run. In the log run, the effect on unemployment was dissipated,
but the informal sector increased in these regions relative to the national average. In light of these
results, they hypothesized that the informal sector worked as an important shock absorber, and
that, in the absence of the informal sector, the effect of import competition on unemployment would
have persisted in the long run. Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020) further investigate this hypothesis and
find that the effect of import competition on unemployment is larger (and the effect on informality
smaller) in regions where informality is more tightly monitored (i.e., in regions where the cost of
informality is higher).
Motivated by these empirical results, we examine the role of the informal sector as a buffer in
the context of our model. Specifically, we study the response of the economy to negative produc-
tivity shocks under three scenarios: (a) Benchmark; (b) Stricter Enforcement Policy; and (c) No
Informality.33 We simulate negative shifts in the ergodic distribution of productivities z amount-
ing to 1.5% and 3%. Figure 10 shows that negative productivity shocks do not lead to increases
in unemployment in the benchmark economy, but do lead to substantial increases in informal
employment—consistent with the long-run results documented by Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019).
On the other hand, negative productivity shocks lead to significant increases in unemployment
under the No Informality and Stricter Enforcement scenarios. In short, the stronger the repression
of informality, the larger the increase of unemployment in response to negative shocks. This finding
is consistent with the hypothesis that the informal sector serves as a shock absorber discussed in
33The research designs of Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019) and Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020) exploit variation across
regions, so that the aggregate effects of trade cannot be identified. These aggregate, common to all regions, effects
include the responses of exchange rates and trade imbalances. Simulations of tariff changes in our framework do
not correspond to their research designs, as such simulations would generate exchange rate responses, whereas in
the aforementioned papers, regions facing differential tariff exposures still face the same exchange rate. Given the
common exposure to exchange rates and trade imbalances, the regional approach isolates the (adverse) competition
effect induced by trade liberalization: some regions face a larger negative labor demand shock than others. One way
to isolate this negative labor demand effect in the context of our model is by simulating aggregate labor demand
shocks induced by aggregate productivity shocks.
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Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019) and Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020).
Figure 10: Negative Productivity Shocks, Informality, Unemployment and Welfare


























Notes: All variables are normalized relative to their values at τc = 2.5. Real Income refers to the real value of the sum of all
wages and profits in the economy. Real Income 2 refers to the real value of the sum of all wages and profits in the economy
including the disutility of unemployment b× Lu.
Next, we investigate how this buffer role of the informal sector translates into welfare effects.
Figure 10 shows that, despite showing the weakest response of unemployment, the benchmark
economy experiences the largest relative decline in real income in response to the negative shock.
What explains this finding? Figure 11 shows that the negative shock leads to a reduction in
aggregate TFP in the benchmark case (in excess of the original negative shock), as resources
are shifted toward less productive informal firms. This effect on TFP is smaller in the Stricter
Enforcement scenario, and goes in the opposite direction in the No Informality case—the negative
productivity shock pushes lower productivity firms out of the market, fully offsetting the original
shock. However, the large increase in unemployment in this case partially offsets the productivity
gains. As a result, if we were to rank the three scenarios in terms of their effects on Real Income,
the ranking would be: Stricter Enforcement > No Informality > Benchmark. If we focused on the
welfare measure that includes the disutility of unemployment (Real Income 2), the corresponding
ranking would become: Stricter Enforcement > Benchmark > No Informality. The important
insight is that the “unemployment buffer effect” of the informal sector does not translate into a
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“welfare buffer effect.” This is because, a certain degree of informality repression reinforces the
“creative destruction” aspect of a negative productivity shock, driving out of the market inefficient
informal firms and increasing aggregate TFP.
We conclude noting that, as discussed earlier and shown in Table 8, in the absence of a produc-
tivity shock, the Stricter Enforcement policy lowers Real Income by 5% relative to the Benchmark.
However, when the economy is hit with the 3% negative shock, Real Income ends up 3% higher
under Stricter Enforcement compared to Benchmark. This suggests that welfare is actually less
responsive to aggregate shocks when informality is somewhat repressed (but not completely elimi-
nated).
Figure 11: Negative Productivity Shocks and Aggregate TFP


















Notes: All variables are normalized relative to their values at τc = 2.5. Aggregate TFP is computed as the weighted average
of the z’s of all active firms—weights are given by firm-level employment.
7 Conclusion
This paper developed a framework for evaluating the role of trade in an environment with a large
informal sector, such as in developing economies. The framework generates several of the patterns
documented by empirical reduced-form work on informality, while yielding new insights on the
labor market, productivity, welfare, and wage inequality effects of trade under informality.
Specifically, our quantitative analysis shows that (1) Informality in the tradable sector is reduced
as an economy opens up to trade; (2) In contrast, informality in the non-tradable sector may increase
(depending on the starting point and the extent of the trade liberalization); (3) As a result, the
total effect of trade openness on informality is ambiguous and may prove very small; and (4) The
informal sector serves as an unemployment buffer when an economy faces a negative productivity
shock. These are patterns that have been documented in the empirical literature and that our
model rationalizes.
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In addition, our analysis yields several new insights. First, we find that the effects of trade on
productivity in the tradable sector are severely understated when the informal sector is left out;
the same is true for the aggregate effects on productivity, though to a lesser extent. Second, we
estimate large welfare gains from trade in the benchmark economy with informality. We find that
these gains are robust to considering alternative setups in which informality is either completely or
partially repressed. Third, we show that repressing informality increases productivity at the expense
of welfare. In constrast, the same productivity gains can be achieved through trade liberalization
while welfare increases. Fourth, we show that trade increases wage inequality in the formal tradable
sector, however, this effect is reversed when the informal sector is incorporated in the analysis.
Finally, we show that while the informal sector serves as an “employment buffer” in the event
of negative productivity shocks, it does not serve as a “welfare buffer”. Despite larger increases
in unemployment, the welfare losses resulting from negative productivity shocks are lower when
informality is partially (but not completely) repressed due to a “creative destruction” effect pushing
inefficient informal firms out of the market in that case.
These results are the outcome of the interaction of the various mechanisms considered in our
model. While we attempted to construct a model that captured the main features of a developing
economy such as Brazil, feasibility constraints dictated a number of choices that could be the focus
of future research. We conclude with highlighting some directions for such research. First, it would
be desirable to incorporate worker heterogeneity in the model. Second, to allow for an intensive
margin in informality (i.e., formal firms that hire informal workers). Third, to allow for more
general preferences and substitution patterns. Finally, our analysis has focused on steady states.
In the future, it would be interesting to explore transition dynamics associated with various policy
changes.
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A Steady-State Distribution of States
A.1 Informal Firms
Denote by Gk (z
′|z) the cumulative distribution function of z′ conditional on z and gk (z′|z) its
density. The period starts with Nki informal firms and distribution of states ψki (z, `) at the very
beginning of stage 1. After (endogenous and exogenous) exit, change in formal status, and entry,
but before labor adjustment (end of stage 1 / beginning of stage 2) the distribution of states is:
ψ̃ki (z, `) ≡





= I [` = 1] Mki
Nki
ψeki (z) + I [` ≥ 1] (1− αk)ψki (z, `) I
stay
ki (z, `) , (A.2)
where Mki is the mass of informal entrants into sector k, ψ
e
ki (z) is the distribution of z productivities











In equation (A.1) the numerator is the total mass of firms with state (z, `). The denominator
is the total mass of firms at the stage we consider. In steady state, entrants replace firms who exit,
so that there are Nki firms at that stage.
After firms make adjustment decisions, and at the production stage (end of stage 2 / beginning
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′] d`. (A.4)
At the end of the period, after production takes place, firms draw their productivity z′ for the
next period (stage 3). In steady state, the distribution of states at the very end of the period (end

















To fix ideas, Table A.1 clarifies the notation for the distribution of states in different stages
within a period.
A.2 Formal Firms
The period starts with Nkf formal firms and distribution of states ψkf (z, `) at the very beginning
of stage 1. After (endogenous and exogenous) exit, change in formal status, and entry, but before
A1
Table A.1: Distributions of States at Different Stages
ψkj Distribution of states at the very beginning, and at the very end of the
period—very beginning of stage 1 and very end of stage 3
ψ̃kj Distribution of states right after entry, exit, and change of formal status
but before labor adjustment—very end of stage 1 / very beginning of stage 2
ψ̂kj Distribution of states after labor adjustment, at the production stage—end of stage 2
labor adjustment (end of stage 1 / beginning of stage 2) the distribution of states is:
ψ̃kf (z, `) ≡=
I [` = 1]Mkfψekf (z)
+I [` ≥ 1] (1− αk)Nkiψki (z, `) Ichangeki (z, `)
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where Mkf is the mass of formal entrants into sector k, ψ
e
kf (z) is the distribution of z productivities











The numerator in equation (A.6) is the total mass of firms with state (z, `). The denominator
is the total mass of firms at the stage we consider. In steady state, entrants replace firms who
exit, so that there are Nkf firms at that stage. After firms make adjustment decisions, and at the
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Lkf (z, `) = `
′) d`. (A.9)
At the end of the period, after production takes place, firms draw their productivity z′ for the next
period (stage 3). In steady state, the distribution of states at the very end of the period (very end



















Let Mk denote the mass of entrants in sector k = C, S. The fraction of entrants into the formal
and informal sectors are given respectively by ωkf and ωki:
ωkf ≡ Pr
(





gek (z) dz, (A.10)
ωki ≡ Pr
(





gek (z) dz. (A.11)
Therefore, the masses of entrants in the formal and informal sectors are given by:
Mki = ωkiMk, (A.12)
Mkf = ωkfMk. (A.13)
The masses of entrants into each sector, Mk, are pinned down by the free entry condition
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gek (z) dz. (A.14)
C Flow conditions for workers and firms
In order to write the labor market clearing conditions, we first define the following quantities.
• Number of workers at the beginning of the period in sector k (before entry, exit, change
of formal status and labor adjustment), working in formal or informal firms (T stands for
”total”):





`ψkj (z, `) d`dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
avg. # of workers per firm
= Lkj (A.15)
for j = f, i and k = C, S.







`ψkj (z, `) d`dz = αkjLkj (A.16)
• Number of workers in sector (k, j) who are fired due to endogenous firm exit:
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kj (z, `) d`dz (A.17)
where (1− αkj)Nkj is the mass of firms that survive after the destruction shock hits.
• Number (mass) of surviving incumbent firms in sector (k, j) in the interim period:
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where ψ̃incumbentkj (z, `) is the distribution of states in the interim stage among surviving
incumbents. Note that this is not the same distribution as ψ̃kj (z, `) as it does not include
entrants. It is obtained as follows:
ψ̃incumbentkj (z, `) ≡
(1− αkj)Nkjψkj (z, `) Istaykj (z, `)
N ′kj
=
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• Total fraction of workers in the formal sector of sector k who are laid off, conditional on
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• Number of firms that start the period as informal firms, but end the period as formal firms
(because they formalized).
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ki (z, `) d`dz, (A.22)
where (1− αk)Nki is the mass of firms that survive after the destruction shock hits.
• Distribution of states among firms that switched from informal to formal, in the interim
period—before adjusting the labor force.
ψ̃ki→f (z, `) ≡
(1− αk)Nkiψki (z, `) Ichangeki (z, `)
N ′ki→f
=
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• Number of workers who start the period in informal firms, but end the period in formal firms
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(A.25)
• Number of workers who start the period in informal firms, but their employers switched to
formal status:
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• Fraction of workers who start employed in the informal sector and leave it in the interim
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(A.27)
With these objects, we can define the equilibrium conditions that refer to labor market flows:
χleaveki Lki = Luµ
e
ki (A.28)





These conditions state that the mass of workers in each sector (k, j) cannot be contracting or
expanding in equilibrium (expressions (A.28) and (A.29)). Finally, the sum of unemployment and
employment levels across sectors equals the total labor force L :
LCf + LCi + LSf + LSi + Lu = L. (A.30)
We can proceed in a similar way to define the equilibrium flow conditions for firms. The relevant
objects follow.
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• Fraction of formal firms exiting sector k:
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• Fraction of informal firms exiting sector k:










ψki (z, `) d`dz (A.32)
• Fraction of informal firms changing status in sector k:





Ichangeki (z, `)ψki (z, `) d`dz (A.33)
Similarly to workers, the mass of firms in each sector (k, j) must be constant in steady state.
This means that the inflow of firms must equal the outflow, which can be written as:
%exitkf Nkf = Mkf + %
change
ki Nki, (A.34)
%exitki Nki = Mki. (A.35)
D Vacancies










where vkj (z, `) is the number of vacancies a firm with productivity z and labor force ` posts and
Mkj
µυ is the number of vacancies posted at entry (and before adjustment in stage 2).
E Unemployment Benefits / Tax Collection / Transfers
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mass of formal workers who transition to unemployment
(A.38)
We impose that
T = GRev −GUI ≥ 0 (A.39)
and that T is rebated to consumers.




















should be considered government revenue as these consist of fines. However, part of these costs
should not, as they consist of opportunity costs associated with informality. Therefore, we do not
add these costs to government revenue. However, the model redistributes these costs to consumers.
One way to view this procedure is that these costs affect/distort the decisions of firms, but we do
not consider these costs as wasted resources.
F Service Sector Market Clearing
Service sector goods are used for final consumption (consumers spend (1− ζ) I on it), intermediate
inputs (firms spend XintS on it) and as inputs for hiring costs, fixed costs and entry costs (and fixed
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where profits π̃ are computed before subtracting hiring costs.
H Trade Balance





I Worker Value Functions
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We use six firm-level datasets containing information on formal and informal firms, as well on
their workers. In addition to those, we use one worker-level dataset—Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego
(PME)—which provides information on workers’ allocations and labor market flows. We impose
the following common filters across all datasets: we exclude firms and workers in the public sector,
agriculture, mining, coal, oil and gas industries. 2003 is our reference year as the ECINF survey
is only available for 1997 and 2003. All monetary values (e.g. revenues and wages) correspond
to annual values. Finally, we rely on data from the 2000 and 2005 IBGE National Accounts to
estimate utility and production function parameters. Sector C—the tradable sector—includes all
manufacturing sectors (excluding mining, coal, oil and gas industries, as mentioned above). Sector
S—the non-tradable sector—includes all services, commerce, construction, transportation, and
utilities sectors. In the following sections, we describe the main variables we generate, as well as
the moments and auxiliary models computed from each dataset.
J.1 RAIS and SECEX
RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais) is a matched employer-employee dataset assembled
by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor every year since 1976. Establishments are identified by their
Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Juŕıdicas (CNPJ) number, which consists of 14 digits. To make
RAIS data compatible with firm-level Census data (PIA, PAS, PAC), we aggregate establishments
to the firm level using the first 8 digits of the CNPJ identifier. For multi-establishment firms
featuring multiple 4-digit CNAE industry codes, we select the code accounting for the largest share
of employment within the firm. A negligible share of firms (0.01 percent) have missing industry
codes, so they are dropped from the analysis. Firm-level wages and employment are measured as of
December of each year. December wages are subsequently annualized. We generate the following
firm-level variables:
• Exit indicator: We pool RAIS data from 2003 through 2005 to create an exit indicator, which
equals one if the firm operates in 2003 but is not found in the data in 2004 nor in 2005.
• Firm-level employment: the firm’s number of employees, measured in December of each year.
Let `i,t denote firm i’s employment size in year t.
• Average firm-level wage: the firm’s annual wage bill divided by number of employees, both
measured in December of each year.
• Firm-level Labor Turnover Rate: for every firm i, we define
Turnoveri =
|`i,2004 − `i,2003|
0.5× (`i,2004 + `i,2003)
.
SECEX (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior) is an administrative dataset from the federal gov-
ernment containing information on all export and import transactions. These transactions are
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identified at the firm-level (through the 8 first digits of the CNPJ identifier) and can be merged to
the firm-level RAIS data. This procedure allows us to compute exporter indicators for all C-sector
firms. This dummy variable equals one if the firm reports any export transaction in 2003 and zero
otherwise (i.e. the firm is found in RAIS but not in SECEX). Using RAIS and SECEX, we compute
the following moments and auxiliary models.
Exit Rate (Formal Firms) – see Table A.3
Separately for C- and S-sector firms, we compute the mean of the exit dummy variable across all
firms.
Exit Regressions (Formal Firms) – see Table A.3
We estimate the following regressions separately for C- and S-sector firms:
Exiti = αk + βk log (`i) + ui
where i denotes a firm, k = C, S denotes sector, ui is the error term, and Exiti indicates whether
firm i, active in 2003, exits the market in 2004.
Average Turnover (Formal Firms) – see Table A.3
We compute, separately for C- and S-sector firms, mean turnover rates across all firms.
Turnover Regressions – see Table A.3
We separately estimate the following regressions, conditional on C- and S-sector firms, respectively:
Turnoveri = αC + βC log (`i,2003) + γCExporteri,2003 + ui
Turnoveri = αS + βS log (`i,2003) + ui
where i denotes a firm, Exporteri,2003 indicates if firm i exports in 2003, ui is the error term
and the remaining variables are defined as above. These regressions are also separately estimated
conditional on expansions and contractions.
Log-Employment Serial Correlations (Formal Firms) – see Table A.3
We compute, separately for C- and S-sector firms, the serial correlations:
Corr (log `i,2003, log `i,2004)k for k = C, S
Size Distribution of Formal Firms – see A.4
We compute, separately for C- and S-sector firms, the mean and standard deviation of log-
employment across all firms, and the mean of log-employment across all C-sector exporters.
Fraction of Exporters – see Table A.5
We compute the share of all formal C-sector firms that export.
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Log-Wages (Formal Firms) – see Table A.6
We compute, separately for C- and S-sector firms, the mean of log-wages across all formal firms.
Log-wage Regressions (Formal Firms) – see Table A.6
We estimate the following regressions, conditional on C- and S-sector firms, respectively (using
data for 2003):
log (wi) = αC + βC log (`i) + γCExporteri + ui
log (wi) = αS + βS log (`i) + ui
where i denote a firm, wi is the (average) wage paid by firm i, ui is the error term and the remaining
variables are defined as above.
J.2 PIA, PAS and PAC (Firm-Level Surveys) and SECEX
Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA), Pesquisa Anual de Comércio (PAC), and Pesquisa Anual de
Serviços (PAS) are firm-level surveys, covering the formal manufacturing, retail and service sec-
tors, respectively. Conducted by the Brazilian Statistical Agency (IBGE), they contain detailed
information on firms’ inputs, output and revenues. They constitute a census for larger firms and a
representative sample for smaller firms. In the manufacturing sector (PIA), all firms with at least
30 employees are part of the census and are surveyed every year, while firms with 5 to 29 employees
are randomly sampled. The PAC (retail sector) and PAS (services) surveys have the same design,
but have lower size thresholds for firms to be included in the census: firms with 20 employees or
more are part of the census, while firms with up to 19 employees are randomly sampled. Finally,
firms in PIA, PAS and PAC are also identified by their 8-digit CNPJ codes. Therefore, we are able
to match SECEX with PIA to identify exporters. We use these datasets to obtain the following
firm-level variables:
• Annual gross revenues
• Export share: for firm i, the share of revenues that comes from exports
Export Sharei =
V alue of Exportsi
Revenuesi
Using PIA, PAS, PAC and SECEX, we compute the following moments and auxiliary models.
Distribution of log-revenues – see Table A.7
We compute the mean and standard deviation of log-revenues across all firms in the C and S
sectors.
Average Export Share
Average export share among all exporters, used to recover de value of dF conditional on σC—see
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Step 4 in section I.1 for details. We obtain that the average export share among exporters equals
0.264.
Fraction of Aggregate Revenues in the Formal C-Sector that is Exported – see Table A.5
Ratio between total exports and total revenues in the (formal) C sector.34
Serial Correlation of log-Revenues – see Table A.7
Corr (logRevenuesi,2004, logRevenuesi,2003) separately for the C and S sectors. These moments
are computed conditional on firms with at least 30 employees for PIA, and conditional on firms
with at least 20 employees for PAS and PAC, so that they are part of the census and therefore
surveyed in both years.
Log-Revenues Regressions – see Table A.7
We estimate the following regressions, conditional on C- and S sector firms (data from 2003):
log (Revenuesi) = αC + βC log (`i) + γCExporteri + ui
log (Revenuesi) = αS + βS log (`i) + ui
where i denotes a firm, ui is the error term and the remaining variables are defined as above.
J.3 ECINF (Pesquisa de Economia Informal Urbana)
ECINF was collected by IBGE in 1997 and 2003, and was designed to be representative of the
universe of urban firms with up to five employees (both formal and informal). It is a matched
employer-employee dataset that contains information on entrepreneurs, their businesses and em-
ployees. We use the same filters for industries we described above. Although a few firms in the
dataset have more than five employees, we restrict attention to those with five employees or less
so that our sample is consistent with the population the survey targets. We define as informal
firms those that do not have a tax registration number, which means that they are not formally
registered as a firm.
ECINF is comprised of two main files. The first contains information on businesses (these are
small businesses, so there are no multi-establishment firms and we can use firm and establish-
ment interchangeably) and the second contains information on workers. Before merging these data
sources, we drop workers who are younger than 18 and older than 64 years old from the individual
level data (only 890 observations are dropped). We then aggregate these data up to the firm level,
providing us with information on firms’ size and wage bill.35 We merge this information with the
first (firm-level) file using a unique firm identifier. Finally, we trim observations below the first
34The denominator comes from PIA’s publication, Table 1.5 (pdf included in the replication folder). The two values
used to compute the denominator correspond to the entries “Gross Revenues” and “Other Operational Revenues” of
manufacturing firms (Indústria da Transformação).
35Thus, if a firm has employees older than 64 or younger than 18 years old they are not accounted for when we
compute firm size.
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percentile of the revenue distribution, which amounts to dropping firms with revenues very close
to zero. We generate the following firm-level variables with ECINF:
• Informality Indicator: Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is not registered with the
tax authorities.
• Annual gross revenues
• Total number of employees
• Average wage: firm’s annual wage bill divided by number of people working at the firm. The
wage bill includes the self-reported take-home earnings of the owner. For one-person firms,
this is equal to the owner’s take-home remuneration.
Using ECINF, we compute the following moments and auxiliary models.
Size Distribution (Informal Firms) – see Table A.8
We compute the following moments of firm-level log-employment separately for C- and S-sector
informal firms: mean and standard deviation.
Distribution of Revenues (Informal Firms) – see Table A.8
We compute the mean of firms’ log-revenues separately for C- and S-sector informal firms.
Log-Wages (Informal Firms) – see Table A.8
We compute the mean of firm-level log-wages separately for C- and S-sector firms.
Regression of Informal Status Indicator vs. Number of Employees – see Table A.8
Informali = αk + βk`i + ui
where i denotes firms, k = C, S denotes sector, and ui is the error term.
J.4 PME
We use the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME) survey to obtain information on worker allocations
and labor market flows. It is a rotating panel, in which individuals in a given household are inter-
viewed for 4 consecutive months, they rest for 8 months and are then re-interviewed for additional
4 consecutive months, which implies a maximum panel length of 16 months. As in the firm-level
data, we exclude those who are employed in the public sector, agriculture, mining, coal, oil and
gas industries. As with ECINF, we only keep individuals who are between 18 and 64 years old. In
addition, we exclude individuals who are out of the labor force, non-wage (unpaid) employees or
employers. Finally, we restrict our attention to the years of 2003 and 2004. Thus, there are three
possible states in our sample:
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(i) Formal workers: those who have a formal labor contract, which in Brazil is defined by having
a booklet (carteira de trabalho) that has been signed by her employer and that registers
workers’ entire employment history in the formal sector
(ii) Informal workers: those who do not have a signed booklet (without a formal contract), which
includes self-employed workers
(iii) Unemployed: those who are not employed, but are actively searching for a job
We employ PME to generate the following moments:
Transition Matrix – see Table A.2
To obtain the annual transition matrix between states, we first estimate the 4-month transition
matrix using information from the first and fourth interviews. Denote this 4-month transition
matrix by M . We then estimate the annual transition matrix by computing M3. This is preferable
to using information from the first and fifth interviews—which are 12 months apart—given the
high attrition rates between the fourth and fifth interviews, which are 8 months apart. This high
attrition is common in panel surveys that have similar designs, as the survey unit is a particular
address (e.g. an apartment) and individuals may move in and out during the 8-month rest period.
Workers’ Allocations – see Table A.2
We use PME’s sample weights to obtain the total number and the shares of individuals in each
of the possible labor market statuses: (i) formal worker in the C sector; (ii) informal worker in
the C sector; (iii) formal worker in the S sector; (iv) informal worker in the S sector; and (v)
unemployment.
J.5 IBGE National Accounts
We employ information available from IBGE’s 2000 and 2005 National Accounts to compute the
share of final expenditures on sector C goods, ζ, sector k’s fraction of intermediate expenditures
on sector C goods, λk, and statistics relevant for the estimation of δk, which drives the importance
of labor in sector k’s production.
We compute ζ using final demand information, excluding Agriculture and Mining to be consistent
with the filters we implemented in the datasets above. We obtain ζ = 0.296, as is reported in Table
6.
To obtain information on δk (conditional on σk), we compute:
Total Expenditures with IntermediatesC
Total Gross RevenuesC
= 0.596,




See Step 3 of section I.1 for details on how to use these statistics to obtain δC and δS .
Finally, we compute λk, for k = C, S, as:
λk =
Total Expenditure with Sector C Intermediates
Total Expenditure with Intermediates (across C and S)
,
leading to λC = 0.645 and λS = 0.291, as is reported in Table 6.
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K Model Fit: Moments Generated by the Model vs. Data
This section compares the moments generated by the model, using our estimates, with those com-
puted from the data. Tables A.2 through A.8 shows that our model is able to replicate several
salient features of the data.
Table A.2: Employment Shares and Transition Rates from Unemployment
Moment Dataset Model Data
Share of Employment Ci PME 0.067 0.059
Share of Employment Cf PME 0.083 0.106
Share of Employment Si PME 0.360 0.351
Share of Employment Sf PME 0.315 0.334
Share Unemployment PME 0.176 0.150
Share Informal Workers (Conditional on Working) PME 0.518 0.482
Trans. Rate from Unemp. to Ci PME 0.062 0.064
Trans. Rate from Unemp. to Cf PME 0.051 0.050
Trans. Rate from Unemp. to Si PME 0.383 0.389
Trans. Rate from Unemp. to Sf PME 0.167 0.161
Trans. Rate from Unemp. to Unemp PME 0.336 0.336
Ratio Trans. to Informal job / Trans. To Formal job PME 2.042 2.146
Table A.3: Turnover-Related Moments and Auxiliary Models (Formal Sectors)
C sector S sector
Dataset Model Data Model Data
Exit Rate RAIS 0.091 0.103 0.089 0.125
Average Firm-level Turnover RAIS 0.231 0.505 0.198 0.525
Corr(log `t+1, log `t) RAIS 0.947 0.929 0.942 0.914
Exiti = α+ β log(`i)
Intercept RAIS 0.154 0.188 0.137 0.185
log(`i) RAIS -0.028 -0.045 -0.040 -0.049
Turnoveri = α+ β log(`i) + γExporteri
Intercept RAIS 0.435 0.741 0.315 0.645
log(`i) RAIS -0.095 -0.126 -0.097 -0.096
Exporteri RAIS 0.071 0.071
Turnoveri = α+ β log(`i) + γExporteri, Conditional on Expansions
Intercept RAIS 0.410 0.692 0.278 0.690
log(`i) RAIS -0.105 -0.138 -0.098 -0.150
Exporteri RAIS 0.119 0.116
Turnoveri = α+ β log(`i) + γExporteri, Conditional on Contractions
Intercept RAIS 0.456 0.744 0.335 0.624
log(`i) RAIS -0.077 -0.101 -0.064 -0.064
Exporteri RAIS 0.056 0.056
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Table A.4: Firm-Size Distribution (Formal Sectors)
C sector S sector
Dataset Model Data Model Data
Avg. Firm-Level log-Employment RAIS 2.249 1.918 1.213 1.237
Std Dev. Firm-Level log-Employment RAIS 0.915 1.416 0.685 1.175
Avg. Exporter log-Employment RAIS+SECEX 3.555 4.014
Table A.5: Trade-Related Moments
Dataset Model Data
Fraction of Exporters (among formal C firms) RAIS + SECEX 0.129 0.073
Total Exports / (Total Formal Manufacturing Revenue) SECEX + IBGE 0.133 0.134
Table A.6: Formal-Sector Wages
C sector S sector
Dataset Model Data Model Data
Avg. log-Wages RAIS 8.635 8.769 8.413 8.567
log(wi) = α+ β log(`i) + γExporteri
Intercept RAIS 8.301 8.509 8.288 8.436
log(`i) RAIS 0.117 0.117 0.103 0.105
Exporteri RAIS 0.542 0.462
Table A.7: Formal-Sector Revenues
C sector S sector
Dataset Model Data Model Data
Avg. log-Revenues IBGE 12.652 12.726 10.898 10.814
Std. Dev. log-Revenues IBGE 1.278 1.874 0.916 1.440
Corr(logRevt, logRevt+1) IBGE 0.727 0.929 0.630 0.845
Revi = α+ β log(`i) + Exporteri
Intercept IBGE 9.995 10.118 9.500 10.004
log(`i) IBGE 1.149 1.000 1.152 0.872
Exporteri IBGE 0.561 1.462
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Table A.8: Informal Sector Moments and Auxiliary Moments
C sector S sector
Dataset Model Data Model Data
Average log-Employment ECINF 0.189 0.105 0.244 0.097
Std. Dev. log-Employment ECINF 0.316 0.303 0.355 0.274
Avg. log-Revenue ECINF 9.596 8.531 9.253 8.953
Avg. log-Wages ECINF 7.825 8.043 7.660 8.440
Informali = α+ β`i
Intercept ECINF 1.308 1.135 1.212 1.130
`i ECINF -0.179 -0.179 -0.202 -0.204
Notes: All statistics are computed conditional on firms with five employees or less,
both in the data and in the model.
A20
L Trade and Wage Inequality: Additional Analyses
This section displays the response of the various terms of the variance decomposition (36) to trade
costs, which are discussed in section 6.1.5.















































































Notes: See variance decomposition (36). Between C =
∑
j∈{f,i}
pCj (E [logw|Cj]− E [logw|C])2.
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Notes: See variance decomposition (36). Between S =
∑
j∈{f,i}
pSj (E [logw|Sj]− E [logw|S])2.
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Supplementary Material – Not for Publication
I Estimation Appendix
I.1 Estimation Algorithm
In this section we describe the estimation algorithm in detail, which we break down into several
steps for expositional clarity.
Before we proceed, remember that value added for domestic producers in sector k is given by:

































σk − (1− δk) (σk − 1)
.
Rewrite value added for domestic producers as











Note that Θk is a solely a function of model’s parameters. On the other hand, Ψk is a function of
model’s parameters but also of equilibrium objects such as PC , PS and dH,k. In turn, value added
for exporters is given by:













ΨC , ΨS , ϑJu are treated as parameters to be estimated along with the remaining ones, but these
are all endogenous variables. The procedure below makes sure that the values guessed for ΨC and
ΨS are equilibrium outcomes (see Step 9 for details). The number of entrants MC and MS will be
set to match ΨC and ΨS . Given knowledge of ϑJu and the remaining parameters, we can recover
the flow utility of unemployment b and the value of unemployment Ju post-estimation.
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Step 1a: λC and λS are obtained from input-output tables and fixed throughout.







where TransitionU→EData is the transition rate from unemployment to employment in the data.
Step 2: Start with a parameter vector guess Ω, including values for ΨC , ΨS and ϑJu .
Step 3: Obtain δk using P
m









(1− δk) (σk − 1)
σk












is obtained from input-output tables.
Step 4: Obtain dF using equation (32):
E [Export Share|Exporter = 1]Data = (1− exp (−σC × dF ))
⇒ dF = −
1
σC
log (1− E [Export Share|Exporter = 1]Data)
E [Export Share|Exporter = 1]Data is the average share of exporters’ gross revenues in sector C
coming from exports, obtained from PIA and SECEX.
Step 5: This step solves for wage schedules wkf (z, `
′), wki (z, `
′) as well as value functions Vkf (z, `),
Vki (z, `), J
e
kf (z, `
′), Jeki (z, `
′), and firms’ policy functions.
Step 5a: Compute value added functions V Ak (z, `).
Step 5b: Compute wage schedules wkf (z, `
′)
• Guess a wage schedule wkf (z, `′)
• Compute the resulting Vkf (z, `′) using (13)
• Compute Jekf (z, `′) using (A.46)
• Compute wukf (z, `′) using equation (27)
• Let ŵukf (z, `′) = ω0 + ω1
V Ak(z,`
′)










• Update wkf (z, `′) = max
{
ŵukf (z, `





• Restart until convergence
Step 5c: Compute wage schedules wki (z, `
′)
• Guess a wage schedule wki (z, `′)
• Compute the resulting Vki (z, `′) using (17)
• Compute Jeki (z, `′) using (A.47)
• Compute wuki (z, `′) using equation (30)




















• Update wki (z, `′) = max
{
ŵuki (z, `





• Restart until convergence
Step 6: Solve for firms’ entry decisions. Compute the fraction of entrants in the formal and
informal sectors as follows:
ωkf ≡ Pr
(


















Therefore, if Mk is the mass of entrants in sector k, the masses of formal and informal entrants in
sector k are given by:
Mki = ωkiMk
Mkf = ωkfMk






















Step 7: Compute the steady-state distribution of states. For informal firms, start with a guess for
ψki. Then, compute










ψki (z, `) d`dz.
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Nki + Mki. Therefore, set
Mki
Nki
, the fraction of sector k informal








ψ̃ki (z, `) = I [` = 1]× %exitki × ψeki (z)









ψ̃ki (z, `) I
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and repeat until convergence of ψki. This converged value of ψki will be used directly in the
computation of ψkf below.
For formal firms, start with guess for ψkf and compute:





Iexitkf (z, `)ψkf (z, `) d`dz,





Ichangeki (z, `)ψki (z, `) d`dz.
In steady state:





























































ψ̃kf (z, `) =








+I [` ≥ 1]×

(1− αk)ψkf (z, `) Istaykf (z, `)
+ (1− αk)
%exitkf ωki
%changeki ωki + %
exit
ki ωkf︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nki
Nkf
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and repeat until convergence of ψkf .











χleaveki (see equations (A.21), (A.25) and (A.27)).







V eki (z) I
informal







These costs will be subtracted from aggregate income, and will be added to the expenditure on
S-sector goods.
Step 9: This step solves for masses of entrants Mk’s, masses of firms Nkj ’s, aggregate vacancies
Vkj ’s and mass of unemployment Lu consistent with ΨC , ΨS , dF and µ
υ.
Step 9a: Write aggregate income I as a function of masses of entrants MC and MS .
Step 9b: Write PC and PS as functions of MC and MS .
Step 9c: Write XintC as a function of MC and MS .
Step 9d: Solve for MSMC that matches ΨC .
Step 9e: Separately pin down MC and MS using the labor market clearing equation L − Lu =∑
k=C,S,j=i,f
Lkj . Express MC and MS as functions of Lu.
Step 9fe: Express masses of firms Nkj as functions of Lu.
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Step 9g: Express aggregate posted vacancies Vkj as functions of Lu.
Step 9h: Use equation for µυ (and the value initially guessed in Step 1 for µυ) to obtain Lu
consistent with ΨC , ΨS , dF and µ
υ.
Step 9i: Go back and obtain masses of entrants Mk’s, masses of firms Nkj ’s, and aggregate
vacancies Vkj ’s.
Step 9j: Recover price indices PC and PS .
Step 9k: Compute deviation between government revenues and spending with unemployment
insurance DevT .
Step 10: Obtain job finding rates µekj using aggregate vacancies Vkj ’s and mass of unemployment




























Step 12: Compute deviation from the labor market clearing equation:
DevL = abs
(




Step 13: Compute all moments to be matched with those in the data.
Step 14: Compute Loss Function. Add Model/Data deviations to equilibrium penalty EQ Penalty.
The objective function is therefore given by
L = Lmom + EQ Penalty
Where Lmom penalizes deviations between moments in the data and EQ Penalty penalizes devia-
tions from the labor market clearing condition:
EQ Penalty = WLDevL +WTabs (min {DevT , 0})
S6
With WL and WT denoting large weights and DevT is the relative deviation between government
revenues and spending with unemployment insurance (see section I.2 for details). We highly penalize
a negative DevT .
Step 15: Optimization routine picks new parameter vector Ω. Go back to Step 1 until convergence.

















Step 17 (Post estimation): At this point, we know Ju and can compute




Step 18 (Post-estimation): Obtain D∗F (this is the parameter that we need for the counterfac-
tuals as dF is endogenous):
D∗F =


















I.2 Estimation Algorithm – Further Details
This section details the steps within Step 9 of the estimation procedure.
Step 9: This step solves for masses of entrants Mk’s, masses of firms Nkj ’s, aggregate vacancies
Vkj ’s consistent with ΨC , ΨS and dF .
We start with some definitions... Averages “per firm”. All these quantities can be computed after






































d`′dz for k = C, S
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(`− Lkf (z, `))
(
1− Ihirekf (z, `)
)]
ψ̃kf (z, `) d`dz for k = C, S











































d`′dz for k = C, S





vkj (z, `) ψ̃kj (z, `) d`dz for k = C, S; j = i, f































































d`′dz for k = C, S; j = i, f.
We cannot compute Avg Pricekj—given Ω, ΨC and ΨS . However, note that:
Avg Pricekj =
(














)δk)Λk ψ̂kj (z, `′) d`′dz,
Avg PriceCf =
(














)δC)ΛC (exp (dF × IxC (z, `′)))−δCσCΛC ψ̂Cf (z, `′) d`′dz.
So, given Ω, ΨC and ΨS we can compute:
˜Avg Pricekj ≡
(

































)δC)ΛC (exp (dF × IxC (z, `′)))−δCσCΛC ψ̂Cf (z, `′) d`′dz
= (PmC )
(σC−1)(1−δC)Avg PriceCf .





























Firm-level expenditures with sector S goods (fixed operating costs, hiring costs, entry
costs, fixed export costs)
ES =










(Avg Hiring CostsCi + cCi)
+










(Avg Hiring CostsSi + cSi)
+

























(Avg Hiring CostsCi + cCi)
+







+ ce,C , (S.7)

















(Avg Hiring CostsSi + cSi)
+ ce,S , (S.8)
Where ES,S is firm-level expenditures with sector S goods (fixed costs, etc) coming from S-sector
activity.
We can therefore write:
ES = ES,C + ES,S
= cCMC + cSMS
Market Clearing (C and S sectors)
Let I denote aggregate income. Then, market clearing in the C and S sectors must lead to:
ζI +XintC = RevC − Exports+ τaImports
(1− ζ) I +XintS + ES = RevS
Imports = Exports
Note that expenditures on intermediates are proportional to gross revenues:
Pmk ιk (z, `) =
(1− δk) (σk − 1)
σk








(1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS
RevS
XintS = (1− λC)




(1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS
RevS
Where RevC and RevS are total gross revenues in sectors C and S respectively. Therefore:
I =
(











+ (τa − 1)Exports
Using
RevC = Avg RevenueCf










RevS = Avg RevenueSf










Exports = Avg ExportsCf







ES = cCMC + cSMS




1− (1− δC) (σC − 1)
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1− (1− δS) (σS − 1)
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− (cCMC + cSMS)
+ (τa − 1)
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Avg ExportsCf













1− (1− δC) (σC − 1)
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1− (1− δS) (σS − 1)
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Step 9b: Write PC and PS as functions of MC and MS .
Price Index Sector C






The domestic component is given by:
P 1−σCH,C = NCfAvg PriceCf +NCiAvg PriceCi
=






 %changeCi ωCi+%exitCi ωCf%exitCf %exitCi ˜Avg PriceCf (PmC )−(σC−1)(1−δC)
+ ωCi
%exitCi
˜Avg PriceCi (PmC )
−(σC−1)(1−δC)
MC
We can therefore write PC,H as:


















The foreign component is given by:
















exp (σC × dH,C)




















Where we have used

































)(1−σC)(1−δC) = (b1C + b2C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bC
MC (S.10)
Price Index Sector S
P 1−σSS = NSfAvg PriceSf +NSiAvg PriceSi
=






 %changeSi ωSi+%exitSi ωSf%exitSf %exitSi ˜Avg PriceSf (PmS )−(σS−1)(1−δS)
+ ωSi
%exitSi
˜Avg PriceSi (PmS )
−(σS−1)(1−δS)
MS



















)(1−σS)(1−δS) = bSMS . (S.11)
Step 9c: Write XintC as a function of MC and MS .
XintC = λC































= dCMC + dSMS
Where
dC = λC








































































Step 9e: Separately pin down MC and MS using the labor market clearing equation L − Lu =∑
k=C,S,j=i,f
Lkj . Express MC and MS as functions of Lu.
To separately pin down MC and MS , use the labor market clearig equation.
L− Lu = NCfAvg SizeCf +NCiAvg SizeCi +NSfAvg SizeSf +NSiAvg SizeSi
=














































At this point, we can only express MC and MS as functions of Lu.


























































































































Step 9f : Express masses of firms Nkj as functions of Lu.




























































Step 9g: Express aggregate posted vacancies Vkj as functions of Lu.
Now, substituting the expressions for the Nkj ’s to obtain the number of vacancies in each sector as
a function of Lu:













































































































Ṽ = VCf + VCi + VSf + VSi










Step 9h: Use equation for µυ to obtain Lu.























Step 9i: Go back and obtain masses of entrants Mk’s (equations (S.14) and (S.15)), masses of
firms Nkj ’s (equations (S.3)-(S.6)), and aggregate vacancies Vkj ’s (equations (S.16)-(S.19)). We are
now able to compute transitions out of unemployment µekj (Step 8).
Step 9j: Recover price indices PC and PS .
Equations (S.1) and (S.10) lead to:
PC =
(bCMC) 11−σC ( 1
λλCC (1− λC)
1−λC
)(1−δC) 11−(1−δC)λC P (1−δC)(1−λC)1−(1−δC)λCS
Defining
$C =






(1− δC) (1− λC)
1− (1− δC)λC





Equations (S.1) and (S.11) lead to:
PS =
(bSMS) 11−σS ( 1
λλSS (1− λS)
1−λS
)(1−δS) 11−(1−δS)(1−λS) P (1−δS)λS1−(1−δS)(1−λS)C
Writing
$S =







1− (1− δS) (1− λS)




Solving the system leads to:








σC − (1− δC) (σC − 1)
σC








σS − (1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS







































+ (τa − 1)





















mass of formal workers who transition to unemployment

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Expenditure with Unemployment Benefits
Government Transfers
T = GRev −GUI








Fix PS at PS . Write the value added function as:


































Rewrite the value added function as:





µυ, ϑJu , dF , ΦC , ΦS are the endogenous variables to be determined in equilibrium. For a given value
of these variables, Steps 1 through 11 below compute the deviations from equilibrium conditions
given by Li (µ
υ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS) for i = 1, ..., 5. We then need to find values (µ

















= 0 for all i = 1, ..., 5. We discuss potential solutions to this
problem in Step 12.
We proceed by first imposing values for ϑJu , µ
υ, dF , ΦC , ΦS .
Step 1: This step solves for wage schedules wkf (z, `
′), wki (z, `
′) as well as value functions Vkf (z, `),
Vki (z, `), J
e
kf (z, `
′), Jeki (z, `
′), and firms’ policy functions.
Step 1a: Compute value added functions V Ak (z, `).
Step 1b: Compute wage schedules wkf (z, `
′)
• Guess a wage schedule wkf (z, `′)
• Compute the resulting Vkf (z, `′) using (13)
• Compute Jekf (z, `′) using (A.46)
• Compute wukf (z, `′) using equation (27)
• Let ŵukf (z, `′) = ω0 + ω1
V Ak(z,`
′)










• Update wkf (z, `′) = max
{
ŵukf (z, `





• Restart until convergence
Step 1c: Compute wage schedules wki (z, `
′)
• Guess a wage schedule wki (z, `′)
• Compute the resulting Vki (z, `′) using (17)
• Compute Jeki (z, `′) using (A.47)
• Compute wuki (z, `′) using equation (30)




















• Update wki (z, `′) = max
{
ŵuki (z, `





• Restart until convergence
Step 2: Solve for firms’ entry decisions. Compute the fraction of entrants in the formal and
informal sectors as follows:
ωkf ≡ Pr
(


















Therefore, if Mk is the mass of entrants in sector k, the masses of formal and informal entrants in
sector k are given by:
Mki = ωkiMk
Mkf = ωkfMk






















Step 3: Compute the steady-state distribution of states. For informal firms, start with a guess for
ψki. Then, compute










ψki (z, `) d`dz.
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Nki + Mki. Therefore, set
Mki
Nki
, the fraction of sector k informal








ψ̃ki (z, `) = I [` = 1]× %exitki × ψeki (z)









ψ̃ki (z, `) I
(



















and repeat until convergence of ψki. This converged value of ψki will be used directly in the
computation of ψkf below.
For formal firms, start with guess for ψkf and compute:





Iexitkf (z, `)ψkf (z, `) d`dz,





Ichangeki (z, `)ψki (z, `) d`dz.
In steady state:





























































ψ̃kf (z, `) =








+I [` ≥ 1]×

(1− αk)ψkf (z, `) Istaykf (z, `)
+ (1− αk)
%exitkf ωki
%changeki ωki + %
exit
ki ωkf︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nki
Nkf












ψ̃kf (z, `) I
(



















and repeat until convergence of ψkf .











χleaveki (see equations (A.21), (A.25) and (A.27)).





V eki (z) I
informal







and compute the deviations
L5 (µ
υ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS) = L5 (ϑJu , µ
υ,ΦS) = Deventry,S =
V eS − ce,S
ce,S
L4 (µ
υ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS) = L4 (ϑJu , µ
υ, dF ,ΦC) = Deventry,C =
V eC − ce,C
ce,C
Step 5: This step solves for masses of entrants Mk’s, masses of firms Nkj ’s, aggregate vacancies
Vkj ’s consistent with ΦC , ΦS , ϑJu , dF and µ
υ.
Step 5a: Write aggregate income I as a function of masses of entrants MC and MS .
Step 5b: Write MC as a functions of PC and MS as a function of MC and PS .
Step 5c: Write XintC as a function of MC and MS
S24
Step 5d: Pin down MC using the equation defining ΦC , then obtain MS .
Step 5e: Obtain masses of firms Nkj .
Step 5f : Obtain aggregate posted vacancies Vkj and Ṽ .
Step 5g: Save the values for PC and PF,C to be used in Step 9.








Step 7: Obtain job finding rates µekj using aggregate vacancies Vkj ’s and mass of unemployment



















































and PC was determined in Step 5. Compute the deviation
L3 (µ




Step 10: Compute deviation from the labor market clearing equation:
L1 (µ
υ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS) = DevL =
L− (LCf + LCi + LSf + LSi + Lu)
L
Step 11: Compute the deviation
L2 (µ



















(1 + r) (ϑJu − b)
Therefore, given µυ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS , we can compute deviations L1, L2, L3, L4, L5.

















= 0 for all i = 1, ..., 5




















A key difficulty is that, given the discrete approximations for the state space, the system above has
discontinuities. We list a few solutions we implemented.
• Solve for the system using a sequential bisection method. This procedure has the drawback
of being very slow.
• Solve for the system using an optimization routine minimizing the norm of the system. This
procedure has the drawback of also being slow and to potentially be stuck in local minima.
• Our preferred solution is to approximate each function Li (µυ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS) with a third
degree polynomial on the arguments. To do so, we draw a large number of values for
(µυ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS) and follow Steps 1 through 11 above to compute Li (µ
υ, ϑJu , dF ,ΦC ,ΦS)
at each of these points. We then fit third degree polynomials for each Li function i = 1, ..., 5.
Finally, we can use an out-of-the shelf solver to find the root of this approximated system.
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II.2 Simulation Algorithm – Details
This section details the steps within Step 5 of the estimation procedure.
Step 5: This step solves for masses of entrants Mk’s, masses of firms Nkj ’s, aggregate vacancies
Vkj ’s consistent with ΦC , ΦS , ϑJu , dF , and µ
υ.
We start with some definitions... Averages ”per firm”. All these quantities can be computed after






































d`′dz for k = C, S






(`− Lkf (z, `))
(
1− Ihirekf (z, `)
)]
ψ̃kf (z, `) d`dz for k = C, S











































d`′dz for k = C, S





vkj (z, `) ψ̃kj (z, `) d`dz for k = C, S; j = i, f































































d`′dz for k = C, S; j = i, f.
We cannot compute Avg Pricekj—given Ω, ΦC and ΦS . However, note that:









)δk)Λk ψ̂kj (z, `′) dzd`′



















(1− δk) (σk − 1)
σk
)(1−δk)Λk
So, given Ω, ΦC and ΦS we can compute:























































Firm-level expenditures with sector S goods (fixed operating costs, hiring costs, entry
S28
costs, fixed export costs)
ES =










(Avg Hiring CostsCi + cCi)
+










(Avg Hiring CostsSi + cSi)
+
























(Avg Hiring CostsCi + cCi)
+

























(Avg Hiring CostsSi + cSi)
+ ce,S ,
Where ES,S is firm-level expenditures with sector S goods (fixed costs, etc) coming from S-sector
activity.
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We can therefore write:
ES = ES,C + ES,S
= cCMC + cSMS
Market Clearing (C and S sectors)
Let I denote aggregate income. Then, market clearing in the C and S sectors must lead to:
ζI +XintC = RevC − Exports+ τaImports
(1− ζ) I +XintS + ES = RevS
Imports = Exports
Note that expenditures on intermediates are proportional to gross revenues:
Pmk ιk (z, `) =
(1− δk) (σk − 1)
σk
Rk (z, `) ,
which leads to:
XintC = λC




(1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS
RevS
XintS = (1− λC)




(1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS
RevS
Where RevC and RevS are total gross revenues in sectors C and S respectively. Therefore:
I =
(











+ (τa − 1)Exports
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Using
RevC = Avg RevenueCf










RevS = Avg RevenueSf










Exports = Avg ExportsCf







ES = cCMC + cSMS
Step 5a: Write aggregate income I as a function of masses of entrants MC and MS .
I =
(
1− (1− δC) (σC − 1)
σC








1− (1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS






− (cCMC + cSMS)
+ (τa − 1)
(
Avg ExportsCf













1− (1− δC) (σC − 1)
σC





+ (τa − 1)
(
Avg ExportsCf










1− (1− δS) (σS − 1)
σS






Step 5b: Write MC as a functions of PC and MS as a function of MC and PS .
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Price Index Sector C





The domestic component is given by:
P 1−σCC,H = NCfAvg PriceCf +NCiAvg PriceCi
=













We can therefore write PC,H as:

















The foreign component is given by:
















exp (σC × dH,C)




















Where we have used






























λC(1−δC)(1−σC) b1CMC + (PC)
λC(1−δC)(1−σC) b2CMC
So that:




bC ≡ b1C + b2C .
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Price Index Sector S
P 1−σSS = NSfAvg PriceSf +NSiAvg PriceSi
=














































Step 5c:Write XintC as a function of MC and MS .
XintC = λC































= dCMC + dSMS
Where
dC = λC





























Step 5d: Pin down PC using the equation defining ΦC , and obtain MC and MS .
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We can now express aggregate income I as a function of PC using equations (S.24), (S.25) and













C = exp (σC × dH,C) =








(ζaC + dC)MC + (ζaS + dS)MS
bCMC
,






















and then for MS using (S.27).

























Step 5f : Obtain aggregate posted vacancies Vkj .
Now, substituting the expressions for the Nkj ’s to obtain the number of vacancies in each sector as
a function of Lu:
VCf = NCfAvg V acanciesCf +
ωCfMC
µυ
VCi = NCiAvg V acanciesCi +
ωCiMC
µυ




VSi = NSiAvg V acanciesSi +
ωSiMS
µυ
Step 5g: Save the values for PC and PF,C :
P 1−σCC = (bCMC)
1
(1−(1−δC)λC)
P 1−σCF,C = (PC)
−λC(1−δC)(σC−1) b2CMC
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